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Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From
Great Writ To Exceptional Remedy
By Yale L. Rosenberg*
Almost a decade ago, two decisions of the United States Supreme
Court signaled a significant transformation of the landscape of federal
habeas corpus. Stone v. Powell1 and Wainwright v. Sykes2 changed the
questions asked by courts appraising the nature and purpose of federal
habeas corpus. The prior emphases had been on the review of claims and
remedy of violations of prisoners' fundamental rights.' Then in Stone v.
Powell, the Court barred Fourth Amendment challenges under 28 U.S.C.
section 2254 by prisoners who had been afforded an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of their search and seizure claims in state court;4 and in
Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court established stringent federal habeas
corpus forfeiture rules against defendants whose attorneys had commit-
ted even inadvertent procedural defaults in assertion of constitutional
claims at their state court trials.5
Together these two rulings set the stage for a jurisprudential shift
that could turn habeas into an extraordinary writ available only in a nar-
row range of cases and situations, rather than a general and unfettered
remedy for vindication of all constitutional rights.6 Looking at the
* Professor of Law, University of Houston
1. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
2. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
3. For discussions of the federal habeas jurisdiction prior to 1976, see generally Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV.
441 (1963); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84, 101-25 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966); Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1315 (1961); Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966).
4. 428 U.S. at 494.
5. 433 U.S. at 87.
6. Justice Brennan's dissents in Powell and Sykes were particularly pessimistic. See 428
U.S. at 502; 433 U.S. at 99. The two decisions spawned numerous law review articles com-
menting on their implications. See, eg., Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights
in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1050 (1978); Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The
Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297 (1978);
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Court's habeas decisions since Powell and Sykes, however, it is possible to
conclude that the doomsayers were, as usual, wrong, that the revolution
has not occurred and is not even close, and that what we are now seeing
in the Court's habeas decisions is the traditional backing and filling of the
common law. Thus, while the conceptual bases of the two decisions have
not been fully extended to their logical limits-the effect of which would
be to permit maximal erosion of the habeas jurisdiction-undoubtedly
habeas jurisdiction has been somewhat restricted and the efficacy of the
habeas remedy has been diminished.
Part I of this Article will consider the impact of the Stone v. Powell
preclusionary doctrine. Although Stone v. Powell has not been extended
beyond its Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule origins, the Court's ra-
tionale still stands as an invitation for curtailment of the writ of habeas
corpus, at least with respect to nonguilt-related claims. Part II analyzes
the cases treating the Wainwright v. Sykes procedural default rules. In
contrast to the stalled momentum of Stone v. Powell, Sykes has been
broadly interpreted so as almost routinely to permit forfeiture of the con-
stitutional claims of habeas petitioners. Further, the cases elaborating on
the Sykes opinion appear to be at odds with both the Court's ineffective
assistance of counsel decisions and its retroactivity rulings. Part III will
study a series of cases that threaten to turn the requirement of exhaustion
of state remedies into a preclusionary device rather than a deferral mech-
anism. Finally, in Part IV, the Article will explore how the Court applies
considerably more lenient forfeiture standards to state prosecutors and
judicial officials than it does to defendants and their attorneys. On the
basis of these analyses, I conclude that in its habeas rulings, the Court
has gone far beyond the traditional common law interpretive process and
is engaging in a result-oriented jurisprudence designed to make habeas
hearings on the merits almost as rare as sightings of Halley's comet.
I. Stone v. Powell. The Sleeping Giant
The 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell provided a new and theretofore
unknown mechanism for carving out whole subject matter areas from the
Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473
(1978). Perhaps the gloomiest article was Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural De-
faults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REv. 341 (1978).
There are, however, a number of commentators who, while not uncritical, appear to view
the decisions in Stone v. Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes at least as steps in the right direction,
see, e.g., Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
367 (1983), or as part of the ebb and flow of social change, see Rosenn, The Great Writ-A
Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1983).
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jurisdiction of the federal habeas court.7 The approach authorized in
that case has the greatest potential for curtailing federal habeas as a rem-
edy for vindication of constitutional rights, for theoretically it permits a
massive evisceration of habeas jurisdiction. Defendants had each been
convicted of a crime in their respective state courts in trials in which each
had unsuccessfully argued that evidence presented was the product of an
unconstitutional search and seizure.8 Each filed a petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2254.1 The Court stated
the issue in these terms:
The question is whether state prisoners-who have been afforded
the opportunity for full and fair consideration of their reliance
upon the exclusionary rule with respect to seized evidence by the
state courts at trial and on direct review-may invoke their claim
again on federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of
extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims.'0
After an extended cost-benefit analysis, the Court responded in the
negative. 
This method of carving out whole subject matter areas from the ju-
risdiction of the federal habeas court is conceptually limitless, easily ac-
7. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 521-22 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
At least since Brown v. Allen, [344 U.S. 443 (1953)], detention emanating from judi-
cial proceedings in which constitutional rights were denied has been deemed 'con-
trary to fundamental law,' and all constitutional claims have thus been cognizable on
federal habeas corpus. There is no foundation in the language or history of the
habeas statutes for discriminating between types of constitutional transgressions
Although the Powell majority denied that it was limiting habeas as a means of litigating
constitutional claims generally, id. at 494 n.37, Justice Brennan in dissent viewed the Court's
decision as permitting "a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all
grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims-for example, of double
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations, and use of invalid identification
procedures-that this Court later decides are not 'guilt-related.'" Id. at 517-18 (footnote
omitted). At the least, language in the majority opinion justified these apprehensions. See,
eg., id. at 491 n.31.
Three years earlier, in his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 250 (1973), Justice Powell, the author of Stone v. Powell, raised the possibility of limiting
federal habeas in this manner. To the same effect, see Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283,
302-03 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
8. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1974); Rice v. Wolff, 573 F.2d 1280, 1283
(8th Cir. 1975).
9. Id.
10. 428 U.S. at 489.
11. Not surprisingly, the Chicago School of Economics gives the Burger Court good
marks. See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
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complished, and almost absolute in its preclusionary result. 12 Moreover,
its very simplicity may engender a snowball effect: today the Fourth
Amendment, tomorrow the Fifth and Sixth."3
Although the Court's methodology in Powell appears simple and
straightforward, the opinion itself is not. The majority's focus on the
nature of the exclusionary rule and its limited deterrent value in federal
habeas proceedings suggests that the Court's rationale might be relatively
narrow and limited to exclusionary remedies created by the Court, such
as the suppression of confessions taken in violation of Miranda.4 On the
other hand, the Court's reasoning may be more broadly interpreted to
include other constitutional claims unrelated to guilt or innocence, such
as those involving grand jury discrimination and double jeopardy.1
12. The opportunity for full and fair litigation in state court is the sole prerequisite for
precluding a federal forum in Fourth Amendment cases. With rare exceptions, the lower
courts interpreting that criterion have found it satisfied, even in highly questionable circum-
stances. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1977) (state court application of
erroneous Fourth Amendment rules did not deprive petitioner of opportunity for full and fair
litigation); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911
(1977) (state court's resolution of Fourth Amendment claim on adequate and independent
state grounds that do not impinge on federal rights satisfies Stone v. Powell); but see Gamble v.
Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding petitioner did not receive sufficient oppor-
tunity when state court did not consider his arguments based on a controlling United States
Supreme Court decision). The lower courts have, however, adopted differing formulations of
what constitutes an opportunity for full and fair litigation. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Riley, 459
U.S. 948 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
13. Justice Powell, concurring in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977), argued
in response to the dissent of the Chief Justice, that the Stone v. Powell issue was not before the
Court and that the question whether to extend Powell to Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims
should be decided only after briefing and argument. During the same Term, the Court de-
clined to decide whether a mere allegation of a Miranda violation, unaccompanied by a claim
of involuntariness or unreliability, should be made subject to the Powell rule. See Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977), discussed infra Part II.
14. See 428 U.S. at 486: "Post-Mapp decisions have established that the [exclusionary]
rule is not a personal constitutional right. . . . Instead,. . . '[it] is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.' " (quot-
ing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
Compare Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974), in which the Court viewed Mi-
randa warnings not as rights protected by the Constitution, but merely as "prophylactic stan-
dards" judicially created to provide practical reinforcement of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
15. See supra note 7. Because Justice Brennan viewed the exclusionary rule as a constitu-
tional ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, conceded by the majority to be applicable at trial
and on appeal, he asserted that the real attack was on the habeas statute and the habeas juris-
diction. 428 U.S. at 506-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice White also dis-
cerned no basis for distinguishing between Fourth Amendment and other constitutional issues.
He declined to join the majority because of the fortuitous circumstance that a certiorari peti-
tioner whose writ was granted and whose exclusionary rule claim was upheld would go free,
whereas an accomplice to the same crime who was tried later, whose certiorari petition was
subsequently denied, and who sought the same relief via federal habeas was out of luck. Id. at
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on finality, comity, federalism, and pres-
ervation of judicial resources 6 indicates the even broader potential scope
of Powell. Arguably, Powell lacks any form of built-in limitation beyond
the assurance of an adequate state process for determining the merits of
federal constitutional claims.17
In spite of the open-ended reasoning of the Powell Court, perhaps
the most arresting point to be made is that in the nearly ten years since
the Powell opinion, the snowball has gathered no moss. The Court has
decided only three cases directly involving Stone v. Powell issues,18 and
its resolution of those questions indicates that there are limits on the
Powell construct. Nevertheless, the results in these cases with respect to
the underlying constitutional rights leave unclear the value of federal
habeas as a vindicator of the particular claims involved.
The Court's most recent interpretation of Powell is Cardwell v. Tay-
lor,1 9 a brief, 1983 per curiam decision. In Cardwell, the Court summa-
rily reversed the Ninth Circuit's remand of a habeas case directing the
district court to consider petitioner's claim that his confession should be
excluded because it was the product of an illegal arrest. The Court con-
cluded that its decision in Dunaway v. New York,2 ° which authorized
suppression of a similar confession, was based on Fourth rather than
Fifth Amendment concerns, and therefore Stone v. Powell precluded reli-
ance on Dunaway in a habeas action. Thus, petitioner could prevail only
by showing involuntariness under the Fifth Amendment.
In one sense, Cardwell is a minor extension of Powell, because it
merely brings confessions secured through Fourth Amendment viola-
tions within the latter's ambit. Compared to the decision in Powell,
which precluded an attack on a vague vagrancy ordinance under which
536-37 (White, J., dissenting). However, Justice White added that he would be willing to join
four other Justices in substantially limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 537-42.
He has since done so. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (opinion of
White, J.) (creating good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
16. 428 U.S. at 491-92 n.31.
17. See id. at 522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority's emphasis on an opportunity
for full and fair litigation may be seen as an acceptance of Professor Bator's view that federal
habeas should be available only where the state's corrective process is inadequate or unfair.
See Bator, supra note 3, at 462, 523-28. See also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1094
(suggesting that Stone v. Powell will be applied where the claim has been litigated in a fair and
adequate forum, and the constitutional right at issue does not create uncertainty that the de-
fendant is guilty, or the claim is one that does not involve the right to be free from conviction
despite guilt, or the right is not granted special protection because of its fundamental nature).
18. Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per curiam); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
19. 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per curiam).
20. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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the petitioner had been arrested and searched,2" the Cardwell ruling
seems quite modest: Cardwell at least allows the habeas court to reach
the voluntariness issue with respect to the confession; Powell effectively
insulates the results of the arrest and search from the scrutiny of the
federal habeas court.22
On the other hand, the extension of Powell to confessions gained as a
result of an illegal arrest presents somewhat different concerns from
those usually involved in Fourth Amendment cases involving the sup-
pression of physical evidence. The rationale for the Dunaway ruling is
that, without suppression of illegally obtained results, the police would
be able to arrest individuals without probable cause, take them to the
police station, give them Miranda warnings, and then secure a valid con-
fession.23 Permitting such conduct could drastically alter our accusato-
21. 428 U.S. at 469-71. Stone v. Powell involved companion cases: one case raised the
issue of the vagueness of a vagrancy ordinance; the other concerned the adequacy of a search
warrant. The Nevada vagrancy ordinance provided:
Every person is a vagrant who
[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without appar-
ent reason or business and
[2] who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when asked
by a police officer to do so
[3] if surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man
that the public safety demands such identification.
Id. at 469 n.l.
While this ordinance is somewhat more specific than the one invalidated in Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), there are strong similarities between the two. See
also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a statute
construed so as to make it a crime for a person lawfully stopped to fail to provide "credible and
reliable" identification and to account for his presence). But see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979), in which the Court upheld a conviction based on evidence seized from a de-
fendant stopped pursuant to a local ordinance requiring a person lawfully stopped to produce
evidence of identity. The majority reasoned that a prudent police officer should not be re-
quired to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 37-38.
The Court, however, created a "possible exception" with respect to "a law so grossly and
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its
flaws." Id. dt 38. It is unclear whether the ordinance in Stone v. Powell comes within the
DeFillippo rule or its "possible exception."
22. Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) [citations
omitted]:
The ultimate issue is whether the State gathered evidence against respondent
through unconstitutional means. Since the State is responsible for the actions of its
legislative bodies as well as for the actions of its police, the State can hardly defend
against this charge of unconstitutional conduct by arguing that the constitutional
defect was the product of legislative action and that the police were merely executing
the laws in good faith.
23. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-19 (1979). See also Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 602 (1975) [citation omitted]:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an un-
constitutional arrest, . . . the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially
diluted. . . . Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause,. . . would
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
rial system and create even greater potential for abuse than exists in
searches for physical evidence. That the Cardwell Court was willing to
take this step, and without so much as briefing and oral argument, sug-
gests that Powell's preclusionary potential should not be
underestimated.24
This potential notwithstanding, the Court refused to extend Powell
in Jackson v. Virginia25 to claims based on the reasonable doubt standard
of proof, and in Rose v. Mitchell,26 to racial discrimination in grand jury
selection. Interestingly, however, in both cases the majority concluded
that, although habeas remained available for such claims, petitioners had
failed to prove their constitutional assertions and were not entitled to
relief. Indeed, the manner in which the majority articulated the contours
of the implicated constitutional rights makes it problematic whether the
habeas remedy will be particularly efficacious in vindicating these rights.
Nevertheless, in the face of strong opposition,27 the Court was willing to
reach and reject the Stone v. Powell argument in cases in which the
claims were ultimately found not to be proved,28 indicating that a major-
ity of the Justices may be reluctant to engage in piecemeal dismantling of
the habeas jurisdiction via this route.
In Rose v. Mitchell,29 the State of Tennessee urged not only that
habeas relief be denied with respect to allegations of grand jury discrimi-
be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made
admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings.
24. Justices Brennan and Marshall, the only dissenters in Cardwell, would have granted
certiorari and heard oral argument. 461 U.S. at 573.
25. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
26. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
27. In Rose v. Mitchell, the grand jury discrimination case, Justices Stewart and Powell
separately concurred in the judgment, but opposed the view that grand jury discrimination
should afford a basis for overturning a conviction. Justice Powell's opinion focused particu-
larly on federal habeas. He thought the Court's ruling was "unprincipled" and "wholly at
odds with ihe history and purpose of the writ," and he concluded that "habeas corpus should
not be available for the vindication of claims, such as respondents' grand jury discrimination
claim, that have nothing to do with the fairness of the claimant's conviction." Id. at 588.
Justice Rehnquist joined the opinions of both Justices Powell and Stewart. Id. at 574, 579.
The Chief Justice joined with the majority on the merits of the grand jury claim, but appar-
ently took no position on the Stone v. Powell issue. Id. at 547 n.1.
In Jackson v. Virginia, the evidentiary sufficiency case, Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment based on rejection of petitioner's
claim on the merits, but believed that the Court's ruling on the availability of habeas would be
"seriously harmful both to the state and federal judiciaries." 443 U.S. at 335. Justice Powell
did not participate in the decision.
28. See infra notes 35-39 & 54-56 and accompanying text.
29. 433 U.S. 545 (1979). Justice Powell's 1977 dissent in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977), made it clear that the Court would soon be called upon to determine whether
claims of grand jury discrimination were cognizable in federal habeas. Id. at 508 n.1.
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nation, but that these claims be considered harmless error, whether on
direct or collateral review.3" The majority rejected the harmless error
argument, citing to an almost century-old line of cases holding that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits criminal conviction if an indictment
issues from a grand jury selected in a racially discriminatory manner.
31
The Court emphasized that such discrimination "strikes at the funda-
mental values of our judicial system and our society as a whole."32
Turning to the Stone v. Powell contention, the Court addressed the
state's assertion that habeas relief should be available only when the error
affects the determination of guilt. Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun noted that the Powell Court "carefully limited the reach of its
opinion. .. [and] made it clear that it was confining its ruling to cases
involving the judicially created exclusionary rule, which had minimal
utility when applied in a habeas corpus proceeding."' 33 He distinguished
the claim of racial discrimination from Powell's exclusionary rule issue
and concluded that the reasoning in Powell was inapplicable in the grand
jury context for several reasons. First, exclusionary rule claims involve
charges of police misconduct, which state courts are competent to re-
view, whereas grand jury discrimination attacks are lodged against the
state trial courts themselves. When state courts rule on these challenges,
the opportunity for "full and fair" litigation, as required by Powell, is
diminished, thus necessitating independent federal review. Second, while
the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, grand jury discrimi-
nation claims-which call into question the very fairness and integrity of
the criminal justice system-are protected "directly" by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the latter context, re-
viewing the merits in habeas does not unnecessarily exacerbate
federalism tensions. Third, the Powell decision "rested to a large extent"
on the view that the exclusionary rule was a minimal deterrent when
applied in habeas corpus, whereas habeas review of grand jury discrimi-
nation claims has a much more substantial educative and deterrent effect.
Finally, the penalty resulting from a finding of grand jury discrimina-
tion-reindictment-is not as severe as the penalty for violation of the
30. 433 U.S. at 550-59.
31. 443 U.S. at 556 (citing, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 87 (1955); Neal v. Dela-
ware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881). See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
32. 443 U.S. at 556.
33. Id. at 560. But see id. at 587 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), arguing
that the majority had overstated the differences between Stone v. Powell and Rose v. Mitchell,
and that the former presaged a limitation on federal habeas with respect to all nonguilt-related
claims.
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exclusionary rule. For these reasons, the Court determined that Powell
was clearly distinguishable.34
What remains unclear from the Court's analysis is whether the ex-
clusionary rule is the sole exception to which the Stone v. Powell preclu-
sionary doctrine applies, or whether instead the Equal Protection Clause
is the sole exception (at least in nonguilt-related claims) to which Stone v
Powell does not apply. The majority's extended discussion of the limited
reach of Powell suggests that the Court may lean toward the former posi-
tion. Arguably, however, because Rose v. Mitchell clearly involves a con-
stitutional violation as opposed to a "judge-made rule," Justice
Blackmun's balancing methodology may reflect an acceptance of the
view that Stone v. Powell's basic premise is that the habeas jurisdiction
need not be available with respect to all constitutional violations. In
other words, by accepting this mode of analysis, the Court may have
revealed that Stone v. Powell was in fact a limitation on the habeas juris-
diction rather than on the exclusionary rule (and other so-called judi-
cially created remedies), and therefore the limitations on habeas may be
extended beyond the latter's confines.
If this view is correct, Rose v. Mitchell does not explain how the
Court will decide which rights will not be cognizable in federal habeas.
Given the majority's focus on racial discrimination, the Court may have
been implying that only certain very "special" rights will not be sent the
way of Stone v. Powell. If so, Justice Blackmun provided no guidelines
for establishing such a hierarchy, although obviously the guilt-innocence
factor would not be critical. It may be that whether a right will be
deemed special or fundamental for this purpose will be defined by
whether the right by its very nature permits an adequate state corrective
34. Id. at 560-64. For a cogent critique of the Court's analysis in Rose v. Mitchell, see
Peller, supra note 3 at 596-602.
The Court's refusal to apply Stone v. Powell to grand jury racial discrimination cases
because of its view of the importance of the implicated right has not prevented it from denying
relief in cases raising such claims, based on less expansive forfeiture grounds. See, e.g., Parker
v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (state court's refusal to consider defendant's grand jury
claim on basis of waiver constituted an adequate and independent state ground precluding
Supreme Court review on direct appeal); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (valid
guilty plea waives antecedent constitutional claim based on discrimination in grand jury selec-
tion process, even though habeas petitioner was unaware of existence of facts underlying claim
at the time plea was entered); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (defendant's failure
to challenge grand jury selection method as racially discriminatory at trial precludes habeas
relief, unless cause and prejudice are established). The decision in Francis v. Henderson
prompted Justice Brennan to assert, in dissent, that either Fay v. Noia's deliberate bypass test
(see infra text accompanying note 65) was dead, or that the right to challenge racially discrimi-
natory grand jury selection methods was a lesser constitutional right. Id. at 546, 551-53 & n.4.
It was the former that proved to be true. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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process, and the Court's emphasis on the need for independent federal
review in the grand jury context suggests this as a possible limitation.
But inasmuch as very few rights go to the integrity of the state judicial
process as do grand jury racial discrimination claims, this reading turns
Stone v. Powell into a sleeping giant.
Despite the Court's refusal in Rose v. Mitchell to extend Stone v.
Powell to grand jury racial discrimination issues, its resolution of the
constitutional claim there lessened the value of habeas as a remedy in
that context: while upholding the availability of habeas, the majority
also constricted the implicated constitutional right. Part of the difficulty
in Mitchell was that the discrimination charged involved only the selec-
tion of the grand jury foreman, and not the entire jury." Under state
law, the foreman was chosen by the judge for a two-year period, and his
or her special powers made that person a pivotal figure in the indictment
process.3 6 The petitioner's evidence indicated that although blacks con-
stituted 30% of the county's population, no black foreman had been cho-
sen during the period 1951-1973, a statistical disparity that at least
arguably required the state to rebut an inference of intentional racial dis-
crimination.37 Indeed, in his dissenting opinion, Justice White did not
"see how respondents could be expected to make a stronger statistical
showing. ,'  The majority, however, found the petitioner's evidence mea-
ger and insufficient to make out a prima facie case, notwithstanding the
state's concession to the contrary on oral argument.3 9
The Court's decision that same Term in Jackson v. Virginia' is in
the same analytical mode as Rose v. Mitchell-allowing habeas review
but rejecting the constitutional claim on the merits. At issue in Jackson
was the standard a federal habeas court is required to use in determining
whether a state court has violated the requirement established in In re
Winship'" of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Prior to Winship, the
Court used the "no evidence" criterion of Thompson v. Louisville.42
35. The majority assumed, without deciding, that discrimination only with respect to se-
lection of the foreman would require that the conviction be set aside. 443 U.S. at 551 n.4.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White stated that the fact that discrimination was
charged only with respect to selection of the foreman had implications with respect to how
discrimination could be proved: the sample size would be so small as to prevent the sort of
overwhelming statistical evidence found in other grand jury cases. Id. at 590-91.
36. See id. at 548 n.2. Although in this particular case the foreman did not vote, that did
not preclude the possibility of prejudice because of the special powers he exercised. Id. at 569.
37. Id. at 565-69.
38. Id. at 592 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 573.
40. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
Thompson was, however, designed to secure the due process right to
"freedom from a wholly arbitrary deprivation of liberty."43 The ruling in
Winship implicated a due process right with respect to sufficiency of the
evidence and thus raised the question whether the standard of review
should be elevated. 4 In Jackson the Court concluded that the nature of
the Winship right required the reviewing court to determine whether
"viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt."'4
In urging the Jackson Court not to depart from the "no evidence"
test, the state was essentially arguing that Stone v. Powell precluded fed-
eral habeas review of such sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims. Respond-
ing to the assertion that application of the reasonable doubt standard
would unduly burden federal habeas courts, the majority said that this
standard would not create a new class of cases, but would merely expand
the implicated constitutional right, and that determination of such issues
could be made on the record without an additional evidentiary hearing.
The federal habeas court's burden would be further diminished by prior
state court review of these claims.46
Justice Stewart tersely rejected the state's arguments, which were
based on comity and the importance of finality in the criminal justice
system. He noted that issues of comity and finality arise whenever a state
prisoner asks a federal court to vindicate any federal constitutional right.
Finally, the Jackson Court specifically distinguished Powell on the
ground that the standard of proof issue is "central to the basic question
of guilt or innocence."'47
The Court's discussion in Jackson of the differences between the pol-
icy concerns presented in Stone v. Powell and in evidentiary sufficiency
cases supports the view that Powell will be construed less expansively
than its analytical approach would theoretically permit. The arguments
relating to burden on the federal habeas court, finality and comity are
common to both cases, and indeed these concerns are arguably more
43. 443 U.S. at 314.
44. Id. at 315-16.
45. Id. at 318-19. After Winship, the lower courts had assumed that as long as a reason-
able doubt instruction had been given at trial, the "no evidence" standard remained sufficient.
The Court rejected this view on the theory that even a properly instructed jury could convict
although no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319; but see
id. at 330-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 320-22.
47. Id. at 323. In its emphasis on the guilt-related nature of the claim, the Court accepts
at least part of Judge Henry Friendly's proposals. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Col-
lateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 142 (1970).
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compelling in the Jackson context. It is simply more difficult for federal
judges to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence relating to the material ele-
ments of crimes defined by state law than it is for them to evaluate famil-
iar federal constitutional claims, such as search and seizure allegations.
Since sufficiency claims to some extent replicate the state criminal trial,
incursions on the finality of judgments are arguably greater in this con-
text. In terms of federalism and comity, federal court directives relating
to guilt and innocence certainly can be seen as more intrusive than set-
ting aside state court convictions because of a violation of other federal
constitutional rights.48 Moreover, with respect to the latter, defendants
usually can be retried without the tainted evidence, whereas a finding of
evidentiary insufficiency precludes reprosecution of the defendant.49
The critical factor, therefore, is the nature of the implicated consti-
tutional right. As the Jackson majority put it, "[t]he constitutional issue
presented in this case is far different from the kind of issue that was the
subject of the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell ... ."'0 Unlike the
majority opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, which focused on the minimal de-
terrent value of the judge-made exclusionary rule to distinguish it from
the equal protection right implicated by discriminatory grand jury selec-
tion, the Court in Jackson discussed only the central importance of the
Winship right without contrasting it in detail to search and seizure
claims. Thus, although the nature of the implicated constitutional right
should be pivotal, the Jackson opinion does not clarify whether the focus
of the Court's analysis will be on the nature of the constitutional claim at
issue or on the nature of the exclusionary rule.
To some extent, the Court's analysis in the grand jury case, focusing
on the nature of the exclusionary rule, tends to support the view that
Powell is an extremely limited case, since very few constitutional claims
would meet the Powell Court's criteria for finding federal habeas unavail-
able.51 The approach in Jackson, however, leaves open the possibility of
a more expansive interpretation of Stone v. Powell, because Jackson's fo-
cus on guilt-related claims implies that constitutional rights unrelated to
guilt or innocence may still fall within the ambit of Stone v. Powell.52
48. See id. at 335-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
50. 443 U.S. at 323.
51. Under this narrow interpretation, Stone v. Powell might be extended only to proce-
dural safeguards stemming from Miranda. See supra note 14. Rose v. Mitchell can, however,
be interpreted much more broadly. See supra text following note 34.
52. In his concurrence in Jackson, Justice Stevens cited Powell and stated that habeas was
"designed to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems." 443
U.S. at 332 n.5.
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While it is true that Rose v. Mitchell establishes that at least one nonguilt-
related claim will remain cognizable,53 the basis for such inclusion re-
mains uncertain.
As in Rose v. Mitchell, the Jackson majority, after determining that
insufficiency claims were reviewable, proceeded to take away what it had
given, concluding that a rational trier of fact could "readily" have found
the habeas petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.54 The concur-
ring Justices, who opposed the majority with respect to availability of
habeas for sufficiency claims, were probably correct in their assertion
that defendant's first degree murder conviction could be upheld under
either the no evidence rule or the new reasonable doubt sufficiency stan-
dard,5" thus raising the question why the majority felt it necessary to
decide the Stone v. Powell issue at all. The Court's arguably gratuitous
resolution of this matter supports the view that a majority is disinclined
to extend Powell to guilt-related constitutional claims. On the other
hand, concurring Justice Stevens may also have been correct that the
majority did not choose the most expansive review standard for insuffi-
ciency of evidence challenges.5 6 To the extent that the Court has selected
a narrower scope of review--one that may be practically indistinguish-
able from the no evidence test-it may be indicating that although the
habeas forum remains available, its efficacy for sufficiency-of-the-evi-
dence claims will be limited.
The Court has thus rebuffed efforts to extend Stone v. Powell to its
analytical outer limits, and so far, the case remains anchored to its
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule moorings. But whether Powell
will linger in splendid isolation remains uncertain. The refusals to extend
Powell involved two "special" rights: grand jury racial discrimination,
which implicates equal protection and the integrity of the state judicial
process, and the reasonable doubt standard, the ultimate guilt-related
due process guarantee. Moreover, although the Court rejected the exten-
sion of Stone v. Powell to these two rights, it accepted Powell's balancing
approach, thus indicating reaffirmation of its preclusionary doctrine.
Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that Stone v. Powell will become the
53. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
54. 443 U.S. at 324.
55. Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). "[I]n practice there may be little
or no difference between a record that does not contain at least some evidence tending to prove
every element of an offense and a record containing so little evidence that no rational factfinder
could be persuaded of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 335.
56. See id. at 334-35. As examples, Justice Stevens stated that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard could be applied by the reviewing court itself or that the reviewing court might not
confine itself solely to the evidence most favorable to the prosecution. Id.
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Usery57 of its genre, and the decision's conceptual reach may yet be ex-
panded at least to additional nonguilt-related constitutional claims. 58 In
any event, the apparent dormancy of the Powell reasoning does not char-
acterize that of the related habeas corpus decision, Wainwright v. Sykes. 59
II. Of Procedural Defaults, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
and Retroactivity
In Wainwright v. Sykes,60 the prisoner's attorney failed to object at
trial to the admission of statements the defendant had made at the police
station.6 1 Sykes subsequently sought federal habeas relief on the ground
that he was intoxicated and therefore had no capacity to understand the
Miranda warnings he received or to waive his rights.62 The United
States Supreme Court held that, because the petitioner had not complied
with state contemporaneous objection rules, federal habeas relief was
unavailable.
The Sykes decision explicitly discarded,63 at least with respect to
such objections at trial,' the deliberate bypass rule of Fay v. Noia,65
57. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment acts as a limitation on Congress' commerce power), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). In the interim between Usery and
Garcia, the Court upheld every federal law challenged under the Usery rationale. See, e.g.,
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Red. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). This led some commentators to ask whether Usery was still
viable. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER & F. SCHAUER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 45 (Supp. 1984). Garcia supplied the answer.
58. Cf Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982), in
which the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 could not be used to challenge the constitutional-
ity of a state law under which a state obtained custody of children and terminated the rights of
natural parents. Although the majority found jurisdiction to be lacking under the statute be-
cause of failure to meet its "custody" requirement, the decision resembles Stone v. Powell in its
approach. The dissent argued that the majority could have reached the same result by finding
that, as a discretionary matter, the petitioning natural mother had not made a sufficient show-
ing that she acted in the interests of her child, therefore making her an inappropriate peti-
tioner. The majority's jurisdictional approach, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) and
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), allows the Court to decide the case on considerably
broader grounds.
59. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 75.
62. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
This claim was alluded to briefly in the Supreme Court's opinion. See 433 U.S. at 74-75.
63. The result in Sykes had been foreshadowed in a series of cases decided in the 1970's.
See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
64. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 n.12 (declining to decide whether the cause and
prejudice requirements should apply to appellate defaults, such as the one in Fay v. Noia, 372
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which had imposed a habeas forfeiture for procedural defaults only if the
defendant personally participated with counsel in a strategic, intentional
relinquishment of the procedure afforded by state law for vindication of
the constitutional claim. The Sykes Court substituted the dual require-
ments that a petitioner in a section 2254 proceeding establish "cause" to
excuse noncompliance with state procedural rules and "prejudice" result-
ing from the alleged constitutional violation.66 The majority dealt with
these requirements in cursory fashion, merely finding that the defendant
had not offered any explanation for his failure to object to the challenged
confession and that other evidence of guilt precluded any possibility of
actual prejudice.67 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion did not elabo-
rate on the meaning of either "cause" or "prejudice," stating that those
terms would be given more "precise content" in later cases.68
Compared to Stone v. Powell, the ruling a year later in Wainwright v.
Sykes may be viewed as a lesser included curtailment because it applies
only to parties committing defaults rather than to entire categories of
constitutional issues. Sykes nonetheless affects many habeas petitioners
and has an especially unfair double-or-nothing effect-those who have
litigated their non-Fourth Amendment constitutional claims in state
court receive another opportunity to do so in a federal forum, whereas
those whose attorneys committed defaults in state court will also be pre-
cluded from litigating such claims in federal court unless they can meet
Sykes' difficult requirements of "cause" and "prejudice." 69
A. The Prejudice Requirement-United States v. Frady
In the eight years since the Sykes decision, the court has taken three
opportunities to provide the promised elaboration of "cause" and "preju-
dice."70 In one of the cases, United States v. Frady,71 the Court held the
"plain error" standard of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
U.S. 391 (1963)). Cf Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985), in which the Court held that
criminal defendants were entitled as of right to effective assistance of counsel on appeals. De-
fendant's attorney had failed to comply with an appellate rule, and as a result his appeal was
dismissed. The Court held that it violated due process for the state to punish the defendant for
his attorney's default by dismissing the appeal. Id. at 838-41. See also infra note 128.
65. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
66. 433 U.S. at 90-91.
67. Id. The Court's discussion of the application of the new standards to Sykes was con-
tained in a single paragraph.
68. Id. at 91.
69. See supra note 66.
70. Two cases deal with the meaning of cause: Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), and
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). In Ross the cause requirement was satisfied; in Engle it
was not. The third case interprets prejudice: United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
71. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
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Procedure, applicable on direct appeal in federal cases, did not apply in
the counterpart section 2255 proceeding used by federal prisoners,
72
when the defendant fails to object contemporaneously to a jury instruc-
tion that impermissibly permits a presumption of malice.73 Instead, the
Court ruled that the appropriate standard for a collateral attack in this
context, as with state prisoners, consists of the cause and prejudice re-
quirements.74 Prejudice was defined so stringently that a court may, in
effect, require a defendant to prove wrongful conviction of the crime.
The Frady majority found it unnecessary to determine whether cause had
been established,75 because the petitioner "suffered no actual prejudice of
a degree sufficient to justify collateral relief nineteen years after his
crime."
76
In the Frady majority opinion, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the prej-
udice formulation for jury instructions articulated in Henderson v.
Kibbe77 that the "degree of prejudice resulting from instruction error be
evaluated in the total context of the events at trial."' 78 Frady's claim of
prejudice was that the instruction relieved the government of its burden
of proving malice, thus denying the jury an adequate opportunity to re-
turn a verdict of manslaughter. In response, the majority stated that
Frady must show not merely that this error created a possibility of preju-
dice, but that it "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in-
fecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.
' '7 9
Because defendant failed to substantiate his claim that he had nothing to
do with the homicide, because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming,
because Frady failed to present evidence that he acted without malice,
and because the jury necessarily found premeditation and deliberation in
reaching its verdict of murder in the first degree, the Court saw "no risk
72. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963); but see infra note 74.
73. The government did not contest Frady's assertion that the jury instruction was erro-
neous, as determined by later court rulings. 456 U.S. at 157-58 n.6.
74. Id. at 167-68. Justice Brennan in dissent argued that there were distinctions between
the § 2254 civil actions and the § 2255 criminal proceedings that militated in favor of retaining
the plain error doctrine in a case involving a federal prisoner. In particular, he noted that the
plain error rule gives federal courts the discretion that most state courts have to waive proce-
dural defaults when necessary, and that comity and federalism tensions were not present in the
§ 2255 context. See id. at 178-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. It is doubtful that Frady could have established cause under the Court's holding the
same day in Engle v. Isaac, discussed infra at notes 92-105 and accompanying text. See 456
U.S. at 168 n.16.
76. Id. at 168.
77. 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
78. 456 U.S. at 169.
79. Id. at 170.
of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. "8 °
The Frady Court's delineation of the prejudice requirement is dis-
cussed only with regard to jury instruction claims. However, the plain
error doctrine of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which the Court said was inapplicable in collateral proceedings,81 encom-
passes all "plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights," not merely
jury instruction errors.82 Thus, although the majority's articulation of
this prejudice test is framed in terms of failure to object to jury instruc-
tions, the test may have applicability beyond that limited context. 83 Er-
rors not properly objected to may therefore have to be viewed in the total
context of the trial, and a defendant-in order to satisfy the prejudice
requirement-may have to meet a strict test of actual and substantial
disadvantage infecting the entire trial with constitutional error and
amounting to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
It is perhaps because the Frady defendant's claim went to the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence84 that the majority stressed his failure to come
forward with evidence that he was not guilty of the crime of which he
was convicted. In cases involving constitutional errors not related to
guilt or innocence, arguably such a requirement should be inappropri-
ate.8 Perhaps a variant of the harmless error doctrine would suffice in
80. Id. at 171-74.
81. Id. at 167-68. See supra note 74.
82. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), which states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substan-
tial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
83. Justice Brennan noted that the cause and prejudice requirements originated with Da-
vis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), in which the Court construed Rule 12(b)(2) of the
FED. R. CRIM. P. to require a defaulting § 2255 applicant claiming discrimination in grand
jury selection to show prejudice as well as cause. Davis was held applicable to the same sort of
defaulted claim in a state court proceeding in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
Those two cases were in turn relied on in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), requiring
showings of cause and prejudice with respect to all state court trial defaults. Justice Brennan
viewed the Frady decision as coming full circle to supplant the plain error rule specified in
Rule 52(b). 456 U.S. at 185-86.
84. The defendant essentially claimed that the government had not met its burden of
proving him guilty of murder in the first degree. 456 U.S. at 170. As Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), makes clear, In re Winship's requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
(see infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text) is not limited to situations in which the de-
fendant would be wholly exonerated or, as the Court put it in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 323-24 (1979), "under our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to complain
that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as a burglar."
85. This is not to suggest that Frady's stringent "actual prejudice" test, requiring evidence
of innocence or of a miscarriage of justice, is appropriate as to guilt-related claims either.
While there is a logical nexus in the guilt-innocence context, the Frady test nonetheless erects
virtually insuperable barriers and improperly shifts the burden to the defendant.
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these circumstances, 8 6 but requiring a colorable claim of innocence ap-
pears to be inapposite.8 7 In the Sykes decision, however, in which the
defaulted claim involved a Miranda violation, the Court's allusion to the
substantial evidence of defendant's guilt and its use of the phrase "mis-
carriage of justice" seem to amount to a rejection of the harmless error
test with respect to nonguilt-related claims.88
The facts of the Frady case clearly suggest that the majority could
have used the plain error criterion to obtain the same result-upholding
the conviction.8 9 This approach would have made it unnecessary to de-
cide whether the cause and prejudice requirements applied to section
2255 proceedings, which in turn would have obviated the need to inter-
pret the prejudice standard.9" In a sense, the Court was reaching out to
extend the Sykes procedural default rulings and to protect the finality of
criminal convictions. Frady can thus be contrasted with the approach
taken by the Court in interpreting Stone v. Powell. In Jackson v. Virginia
and Rose v. Mitchell, the Justices reached out to decide that Powell was
not going to be extended, even though in those very cases the majority
determined that petitioners had not in any event established their consti-
86. See Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes, The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1683, 1700-01 (1979) (discussing various formulations of the harmless error
standard and other tests used to define actual prejudice).
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court ruled that the harmless error test
requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged constitutional violation
did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Therefore, when unconstitutional evidence is
merely cumulative and there is untainted and overwhelming proof of guilt, the constitutional
error is deemed harmless. Because the Chapman Court rejected California's argument that a
more stringent "miscarriage of justice" standard should govern, 386 U.S. at 23, and because
the Sykes majority accepted such a miscarriage of justice test in its discussion of cause and
prejudice, 433 U.S. at 90-91, it appears that the Sykes' requirements are harsher than the
harmless error test. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
87. But see Friendly, supra note 47, at 150-53.
88. See 433 U.S. at 91. See also Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the
Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 508-09 (1978), arguing that, since the harmless error
doctrine had long been the law at the time Sykes was decided, Sykes' actual prejudice require-
ment must have been intimating a more stringent standard. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. at 97-98 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) and id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the actual prejudice test was similar to the harmless error doctrine).
89. In addition to other extremely damaging evidence, there was evidence that Frady and
an accomplice, covered with the blood of the deceased, were apprehended while running from
the victim's house. Frady contended that the real killer escaped while the police were arresting
him. 456 U.S. at 154-56.
90. In Frady, the United States urged in its brief that the defendant had not shown plain
error, and Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on the basis of the government's argu-
ment. Id. at 187. Justice Brennan stated that had the Court decided the case on a plain error
basis, it would have been difficult for him to dissent. Id. at 187; see also supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
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tutional claims.91 Those cases support the view that the Court is not
eager to extend Powell to at least certain types of constitutional issues,
whereas the Frady Court's broad sweep suggests a willingness to rein-
force the stringency of Sykes' requirements and indicates that the cause
and prejudice standards are being made more difficult for petitioners to
meet.
B. The Cause Requirement
1. Engle v. Isaac and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Although the Court's two decisions interpreting cause reached op-
posite results, both opinions are in line with Frady's insistence on finality
in the criminal justice process and its consequent tightening of the re-
quirements for excusing procedural defaults. In Engle v. Isaac,9" decided
the same day as Frady, petitioners alleged on appeal that the jury instruc-
tions at their state criminal trials impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof for self-defense, thus violating the requirements set forth in In re
Winship93 and Mullaney v. Wilbur.94 Petitioners had not objected to
these instructions at trial, although required to do so by the Ohio Rules
of Criminal Procedure.95 Their trials were conducted after the decision
in Winship, but prior to or immediately after the ruling in Mullaney.9 6
Winship merely held that the state must prove every material element of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 97 Mullaney ruled that Winship pro-
91. See supra notes 35-39, 54-56 and accompanying text.
92. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
93. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Although the Court's decision only prohibited the state from
shifting the burden of proof with respect to malice (if malice is an element of the crime, Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)), some courts have applied the Mullaney ruling to self-
defense on the theory that this defense will negate purposeful conduct, the mens rea require-
ment for the crime. See, e.g., cases noted in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 122 nn.22-24.
Although there are significant differences between the defense of insanity and that of self-
defense, several of the Court's decisions indicate that the Isaac petitioners' claims might have
been rejected on the merits. See, e.g., Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (mem.) (sum-
marily affirming a conviction pursuant to a statute requiring defendant to prove insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholding a statute
requiring defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (reaffirming the vitality of these decisions notwithstanding the rulings in Win-
ship and Mullaney).
95. 456 U.S. at 124-25.
96. Two of the petitioners had been tried prior to the decision in Mullaney, while the trial
of the third, Isaac, occurred three months thereafter. 456 U.S. at 133 n.42.
97. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), was a juvenile delinquency case in which the
Court invalidated a New York statute permitting the state to adjudicate a child delinquent by a
mere preponderance of the evidence. The Court ruled that the reasonable doubt standard was
constitutionally required both in juvenile cases and in adult criminal prosecutions, although
the latter issue was not before the Court. For an explanation why the Court characterized its
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hibited the state from shifting to the defendant the burden of proving
absence of malice in a murder prosecution.98 The Engle defendants
claimed that they could not have known at the time of trial that Winship
could be applied to prohibit the shifting of burdens with respect to affirm-
ative defenses,99 and that in any event, an objection to the jury instruc-
tions would have been futile in view of the long standing rule in Ohio
requiring defendants to bear the burden of proving self-defense.1"'
The futility argument was rejected out of hand as a deliberate bypass
of state courts and thus was held insufficient by itself to constitute cause
for failure to object.10 ' The Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the novelty of a constitutional claim could ever establish cause,
because these claims were not unknown at the times of the petitioners'
trials. Winship, decided four and one half years before any of these trials,
afforded a foundation for fashioning their arguments about the burden of
proof of affirmative defenses. Indeed, the Court noted that during the
interim period many defendants had relied on Winship to challenge the
allocation of the burden of proof for various affirmative defenses and sev-
eral state courts had accepted their theories."0 2 Under these circum-
stances, the majority concluded that defendants could have asserted their
claims at trial. Thus, although the Court previously had held both Mul-
laney and Winship to be completely retroactive,10 3 the ruling in Engle
effectively denies retroactive application to those tried after Winship who
did not raise the issue at trial. 1°4
reasonable doubt standard for adults as a "holding," see Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights
of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA
L. REv. 656, 674-75 (1980).
98. In Mullaney, the challenged statute required the defendant to prove heat of passion in
order to reduce the murder charge to manslaughter. Under those circumstances, heat of pas-
sion negated malice, which was a specific element of the crime of murder. On the other hand,
in its subsequent decision in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the majority found
Mullaney inapplicable to a more modem statute patterned after the Model Penal Code that
similarly required defendant to prove "extreme emotional disturbance" (the contemporary
successor to common law heat of passion) to reduce murder to manslaughter, since malice was
not explicitly designated as an element of the crime. Id. at 199. The dissent viewed the result
as a triumph of form over substance, because it allowed the legislature to violate Winship by
manipulating the elements of the crime. Id. at 221-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
99. 456 U.S. at 130. See also supra notes 94, 97 & 98.
100. 456 U.S. at 130.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 131-33 & n.40.
103. Mullaney was held retroactive in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977),
as was Winship in Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam). But cf
infra note 139.
104. In Hankerson, 432 U.S. at 244 n.8, the majority suggested that its retroactivity ruling
might be mitigated by enforcing waivers with respect to defendants who had failed to make
appropriate objections.
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The only additional guidance given by the Engle Court with respect
to the meaning of the cause and prejudice requirements is in connection
with its rejection of petitioners' argument that these requirements be
either supplanted or supplemented with a plain error rule. The majority
stated that the plain error test is unnecessary to correct "miscarriages of
justice," since victims of such miscarriages would be able to meet the
cause and prejudice criteria. The Court noted that the latter were not
"rigid concepts," but rather were rooted in principles of comity and final-
ity that would yield in the case of a "fundamentally unjust
incarceration. "105
Notwithstanding the Engle Court's discussion of numerous pre-
Mullaney burden of proof claims percolating in the lower courts after the
decision in Winship, "6 Mullaney represents a sophisticated extension of
the concepts articulated in Winship. Indeed, the Engle majority ac-
knowledged this when it stated that it was not suggesting that even every
"astute" attorney would have asserted these arguments in the interim
between Winship and Mullaney." 7 Justice O'Connor recognized, at least
tacitly, the underlying tension between the cause and prejudice require-
ments and the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; she
pointed out that the Bill of Rights entitles the accused only to "a fair trial
and a competent attorney"' °8 and not to an especially "astute" lawyer.
She further stated that "[w]here the basis of a constitutional claim is
available, and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated that
claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against labeling alleged
unawareness of the objection as cause for a procedural default."10 9 In
other words, with respect to individuals represented by merely compe-
tent criminal defense attorneys who are not sufficiently prescient or
skilled to be on the cutting edge of constitutional litigation, the "de-
105. 456 U.S. at 135.
106. In fact, the Engle majority pointed out that even before Winship was decided, a few
courts had ruled or stated that state laws shifting the burden of proof violated due process. Id.
at 131 n.39. Those few cases, however, were ruled insufficient to preclude establishment of
cause by defaulting defendants tried before Winship. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984),
discussed infra notes 138-156 and accompanying text.
107. 456 U.S. at 133. Three years before Engle, in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979), the Court held that Winship required the reasonable doubt standard to be applied in
federal habeas proceedings to test the sufficiency of the evidence. Justice Stevens (joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist) disagreed, arguing that "nothing in the Winship opinion
suggests that it also bore on appellate or habeas corpus procedures." 456 U.S. at 330-31 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). He noted that in Winship it was the trial judge who had acknowledged
that he was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the juvenile's guilt. Id. at 330. Thus,
the Justices themselves have not always agreed on Winship's implications.
108. 456 U.S. at 134.
109. Id.
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mands of comity and finality" require that defendants forfeit the oppor-
tunity to vindicate their constitutional rights through federal court
habeas corpus actions. Thus, defendant faces a formidable "Catch-22":
counsel for the defendant may be sufficiently competent to preclude an
ineffective assistance claim, yet insufficiently astute to enable the accused
to avoid a procedural default or to meet the apparently more difficult
cause and prejudice requirements.11 °
The 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington,"' delineating the
requirements for proving ineffective assistance violations, reinforces this
view of the defendant's dilemma. The Strickland test for establishing
such claims has two prongs. First, the defendant must show that the
attorney's performance was deficient by identifying acts or omissions of
counsel that are not the result of reasonable professional judgment, and
the reviewing court must determine whether under all the circumstances
these acts or omissions were outside the "wide range" of professionally
competent assistance.1" Second, the defendant must establish that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the results of the trial would have been different-that absent the errors,
the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.1
1 3
The focus of the Court's opinion is thus on the unreliability of the fact-
finding procedure that results from a breakdown in the adversarial
process."I4
Although the Strickland Court said that no "special standards" 5
110. Some lower courts interpreting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), have, how-
ever, found cause established where the attorneys' defaults were so serious that they might well
amount to ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1980) (coun-
sel failed to correct false trial testimony because of conflict of interest); Rachel v.
Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978) (trial counsel submitted affidavits swearing that
their failure to object to the prosecutor's comments was due to their lack of knowledge of the
law); Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant's lawyer did not object
to non-unanimous verdict and failed to perfect appeal notwithstanding defendant's request
that he do so). On the other hand, garden variety defaults have not been found to establish
cause. See, e.g., Spillers v. Housewright, 692 F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1982); Tyler v. Phelps, 643
F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 935 (1982); Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d I
(Ist Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1981).
111. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
112. Id. at 2066.
113. Id. at 2067-69. See also United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), holding that,
absent surrounding circumstances that make it unlikely that the accused could have received
effective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant can make out a claim of ineffective assist-
ance only by showing specific errors committed by defense counsel.
114. 466 U.S. at 2069.
115. Id. at 2070. The majority noted that cause and prejudice must be proved in other
default contexts because of the strong presumption of finality in collateral attacks; it distin-
guished ineffectiveness claims as attacks "on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose
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should apply to ineffective assistance claims in habeas cases, it noted that
determinations with respect to ineffective assistance are mixed questions
of law and fact and thus not binding on federal courts in the manner that
state court findings of basic fact are."' The majority also suggested that
its new test might not be too different from the low level "farce and
mockery" standard previously adopted by some of the lower courts 17
and that judicial assessment of an attorney's performance must be
"highly deferential." '118 Nonetheless, the Court's formulation of the
standard for prejudice in ineffective assistance claims appears to be some-
what less stringent than the prejudice standard for procedural defaults.
Whereas the Frady test for prejudice requires, at least with respect to
jury instructions, an infection of the entire trial sufficient to violate due
process," 9 Strickland's prejudice test mandates a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. 120
On the other hand, it is not likely that the Court would have created a
substantial disparity in the standards of prejudice, since that would invite
litigants to mask procedural defaults as ineffective assistance claims. 2 '
Perhaps it is because of this possibility that the Court in Engle, two years
earlier, made it clear that while counsel might be required to be highly
astute in order to preserve a federal remedy by anticipating legal develop-
ments, failure to do so would not necessarily constitute a Sixth Amend-
ment violation.1 22  While this obviates one form of tension between
ineffective assistance claims and procedural defaults, it leaves the troub-
ling possibility that a defendant may forfeit the right to assert constitu-
tional claims of a sophisticated nature in federal habeas actions if he or
result is challenged," and concluded that "[s]ince fundamental fairness is the central concern
of the writ of habeas corpus,. . . no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims
made in habeas proceedings." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2069. See, eg., United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1033 (1975) (requiring defense counsel's ineffectiveness to be so substantial as to
render the trial a farce and a mockery).
118. 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
119. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
120. See 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
121. Compare LiPuma v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861
(1977) (holding that Stone v. Powell applies to petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim of ineffec-
tive assistance based on counsel's failure to move for a suppression hearing) with Sallie v.
North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979) (reach-
ing contrary result). The Supreme Court recently agreed to review a Third Circuit decision
holding that a Sixth Amendment claim based solely on failure to assert a Fourth Amendment
objection was not barred by Stone v. Powell. The case before the Court also raises the issue
whether such an ineffective assistance claim is barred by Wainright v. Sykes. See Morrison v.
Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1985).
122. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
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she is represented by a "merely" competent criminal lawyer.' 23
The Court's recent grant of certiorari in Sielaff v. Carrier24 in-
creases the likelihood that Engle will be interpreted to bar even ordinary
claims not raised due to counsel's negligence or inadvertence falling short
of ineffective assistance.125 In Carrier, although the defendant's attorney
had properly raised the issue at trial,126 on appeal he failed to press the
contention that the trial judge's refusal to order production of certain
material by the district attorney violated the due process rights of the
accused.127 In a subsequent federal habeas action, a divided panel of the
Fourth Circuit found Sykes' cause and prejudice standards applicable to
appellate defaults' and ruled that an attorney's default not amounting
123. A similar tension exists in cases in which the Court has held that defendant's guilty
plea bars assertion of antecedent constitutional violations. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The test for attacking the valid-
ity of the plea in that context is whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence
demanded by attorneys in criminal cases. The Court emphasized that counsel need not be
omniscient in foreseeing the outcome of a particular constitutional claim. See McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772-73 (1970), in which the Court upheld defendant's guilty plea
notwithstanding his coerced confession claim and despite the fact that New York's procedure
for testing the voluntariness of confessions was subsequently held unconstitutional in Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), a decision that was retroactively applied. Id. at 773. Thus,
defendants whose lawyers were prescient enough to advise them to challenge the subsequently
invalidated New York procedure were entitled to the retroactive benefits of Jackson, while
those whose attorneys were competent but less astute could claim neither ineffective assistance
of counsel nor the benefits of the Jackson ruling.
124. 53 U.S.L.W. 3903 (U.S. July 1, 1985).
125. The questions presented were: (1) Is attorney error based on ignorance or inadver-
tence, which does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Sixth Amend-
ment, sufficient to establish "cause" required to excuse procedural default under Wainwright v.
Sykes? (2) May exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be circumvented merely because
claim of attorney error is asserted to establish Wainwright "cause" rather than as independent
ground for habeas corpus relief? 53 U.S.L.W. 3903 (U.S. July 1, 1985).
The state's exhaustion argument is that Virginia recognizes attorney errors of sufficient
magnitude as a basis for excusing procedural defaults, and that therefore Carrier's contention
in this regard must first be presented to the state court. Brief of Petitioner at 23-30, Sielaff v.
Carrier, 105 S. Ct. 3523 (1985). The Fourth Circuit panel rejected this contention on the
ground that section 2254's exhaustion requirement "pertains to independent claims for habeas
relief, not to the proffer of Wainwright cause and prejudice." Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d 396,
402 (4th Cir. 1983).
126. According to the dissenting judge on the Fourth Circuit panel, however, trial counsel
had not raised the claim properly, because he had merely sought statements pursuant to Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), for purposes of cross examination, rather than for dis-
covery pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d at
403-04 (Hall, J., dissenting).
127. Carrier v. Hutto, 724 F.2d at 398.
128. The Sykes Court left open whether its cause and prejudice requirements would sup-
plant the deliberate bypass test of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), with respect to appellate
defaults. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 n.12 (1977). In Carrier, 724 F.2d at 399
n.2, the Fourth Circuit, relying on its decision in Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.)
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to ineffective assistance may constitute cause, provided it stems from ig-
norance or inadvertence rather than being a deliberate tactical deci-
sion. 29 The majority suggested that it would be irrational to mandate a
showing of ineffective assistance to satisfy the cause requirement, since
that would constitute an independent basis for relief, rendering the forfei-
ture of other due process claims irrelevant. 130 The dissenter contended
that this interpretation of the cause standard would ultimately under-
mine all contemporaneous objection rules, since every default by counsel,
which would presumptively preclude habeas relief under Sykes, would,
by virtue of a claim of attorney ignorance, constitute cause under that
very case.' 3 1 In a 5-to-4 per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit en banc
agreed with the panel majority.' 32  Given Engle's apparent expectation
(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980), applied the Sykes standards to appellate defaults.
In view of the Sykes Court's concern about interfering with contemporaneous objection rules
that require instantaneous decisions by counsel at trial, 433 U.S. at 88-89, it is at least arguable
that a different rule should govern with respect to decisions of appellate counsel, since these
decisions can and should be made after deliberation and consultation with the client.
Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985), held that the state could not deprive defendant of
his right to appeal because of his attorney's failure to comply with the state's rules of appellate
procedure and that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal
as of right. However, in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Court held that counsel
exercising professional judgment is not required to raise every nonfrivolous contention prof-
fered by the client. That decision, however, left undecided whether an attorney's refusal to
raise such claims would constitute cause under Sykes. Id. at 753 n.7.
In its amicus brief in the Carrier case, the United States contends that the Court, in Reed
v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), "held that the 'cause and prejudice' standard applies to appel-
late defaults as well as trial defaults." Brief of United States, at 22 (emphasis added). While
that case involved a post-trial default that was considered within the cause and prejudice
framework, the majority did not specifically address the issue of whether Fay v. Noia should be
overruled in the appellate context. Such a concession seems unlikely, since Justice Brennan,
who wrote the Noia majority opinion and who has been a persistent critic of the Court's re-
strictive habeas rulings, see, ag., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 178 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), also
wrote the majority opinion in Reed v. Ross. Because Justice Brennan's majority in Reed v.
Ross was a fragile one, see infra note 156 and accompanying text, he may not have deemed it
advisable to address this issue specifically. This form of treatment allows Reed v. Ross to be
viewed in the same manner as Fourth Amendment habeas cases decided prior to Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 456 (1976). In Stone v. Powell, the majority stated that it was not bound by
earlier federal habeas decisions entertaining Fourth Amendment claims, because these deci-
sions had not "fully" considered whether federal habeas was available with respect to such
claims. Id. at 480-8 1.
129. The panel majority concluded that counsel's deliberate strategic defaults could form a
basis for relief only under the Sixth Amendment, because tactics are entrusted to the lawyer's
judgment. 724 F.2d at 401. The dissenting judge thought that there was a great likelihood
that the default in question was tactical, because defense counsel had originally included the
issue in his notice of appeal but then did not brief it. Id. at 405 (Hall, J., dissenting).
130. See Id.
131. Id. at 405 (Hall, J., dissenting).
132. Carrier v. Hutto, 754 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Summer 19851
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
that criminal defense attorneys anticipate sophisticated extensions of em-
bryonic case law,133 it would not be surprising if a Supreme Court major-
ity in Carrier adopted the position that attorney error may never
constitute cause to excuse any procedural default and may only be raised
in the context of a Sixth Amendment claim.
1 34
In addition to putting defendants who cannot retain prescient attor-
neys at a considerable disadvantage, Engle also appears to be at odds
with the Stone v. Powell line of cases. The absence of competent counsel
implicates many of the concerns that appear to underlie Stone v. Powell
and its progeny. Effective assistance of counsel is a special or fundamen-
tal right intimately related to guilt or innocence, the denial of which indi-
cates an inadequate state corrective process. Yet to impose a forfeiture
on a defendant because of counsel's omissions-while making it difficult
to establish that these attorney errors constitute ineffective assistance-
increases the likelihood that defendants with inferior attorneys will be
left without a remedy. Thus, the very factors that appear to militate in
favor of the continued availability of habeas in the Stone v. Powell line of
cases do not accomplish that result in the Wainwright v. Sykes line of
cases.
Such an "airtight system of forfeitures" '35 might be justified with
respect to nonguilt-related constitutional claims, but makes very little
sense when applied to constitutional violations that affect the accuracy of
the fact-finding procedure. In Engle, the Court was asked to limit Sykes'
stringent cause and prejudice requirements to nonguilt-related claims.
The majority rejected that argument because of the great costs imposed
by federal habeas, to wit, preclusion of finality, downgrading the promi-
nence of the trial, inability to punish offenders and impingement on fed-
eralism.1 36 Thus, notwithstanding the majority's insistence that the writ
remain available to set aside fundamentally unfair incarceration or to
correct miscarriages of justice, the cause requirement, as articulated in
Engle, makes it more likely that innocent persons will be denied relief.
133. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
134. This is the position adopted by the United States in its amicus brief to the court in
Carrier. The government contended that under Sykes, whether there was a procedural default
turned on objectively verifiable events (e.g., failure to object). Cause excusing such default
similarly should be based:
on an objectively verifiable and external impediment to the defense's developing or
presenting the claim-such as the refusal by the trial or appellate court to entertain
the claim or the impracticability of raising it, interference by officials with the asser-
tion of the right, or the unavailability at the time of trial or appeal of the factual or
legal basis of the claim.
Amicus Brief of United States, at 8.
135. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 105 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. 456 U.S. at 126-29.
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This again is inconsistent with the Court's refusal in the Stone v. Powell
line of cases to extend that preclusionary doctrine beyond the judge-
made exclusionary rule.137 The Court thus appears more interested in
preserving habeas with respect to claims affecting guilt or innocence in
the Powell context than it is with respect to procedural defaults. Presum-
ably, the majority does not wish to cut off all access to a federal forum
with respect to whole categories of guilt-related claims, but it is willing to
do so on a piecemeal basis using the procedural default mechanism.
2. Reed v. Ross and Retroactivity
There are, however, limits to the stringent cause requirement for
excusing procedural defaults. In Reed v. Ross, 131 the Court resolved an
issue left open in Engle. In a 5-4 decision, 139 the Court concluded "that
where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reason-
ably available to counsel," a defendant will be deemed to have estab-
lished cause for failure to comply with state procedural rules governing
assertion of such a claim." According to the majority, defaults by at-
torneys in these contexts do not implicate the concerns normally present
in default situations. 4 At issue in Ross was the effect to be given a fail-
ure to object to jury instructions that impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof with respect to malice at a trial conducted before Winship was de-
cided. The majority confined its ruling on whether an attorney had a
reasonable basis to object to the situation in which the Court articulated
a previously unrecognized constitutional principle but held it to be retro-
active. If retroactive application were given to a decision of the Court
that explicitly overruled its own precedent or overturned a longstanding
and widespread practice sanctioned by the lower courts, there would be
no reasonable basis for an attorney to object, and defaults in these cir-
137. See supra notes 29-58 and accompanying text; see also Engle, 456 U.S. at 149-50
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984).
139. The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by Justices Marshall,
White, Powell, and Stevens. Justice Powell, however, wrote a concurring opinion stating that
although he had joined the majority opinion, he continued to adhere to the view that cases
should not be applied retroactively on collateral review other than in exceptional circum-
stances. Only because North Carolina had not raised that issue did Ross prevail. See infra
note 156 and accompanying text.
140. 104 S. Ct. at 2910.
141. The majority asserted that it is reasonable to assume that if counsel cannot perceive
the possibility of raising a claim, it is unlikely that a court would consider it seriously. Were
the rule otherwise, attorneys would raise every conceivable claim, thus disrupting state court
proceedings. Id. at 2910.
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cumstances would thus be excused. 142
The defendant in Ross did not fall into either of these categories, but
into a third category presenting greater difficulty, namely, one in which
the Court arguably had sanctioned a particular rule that was subse-
quently overturned. At the time that Ross appealed his conviction in the
state courts, the Supreme Court decision most directly on point sug-
gested that there was no constitutional barrier to the state shifting bur-
dens of proof in criminal cases,14 and the North Carolina courts, in
which Ross was tried, had consistently approved such practices. 144 The
meager case law in other jurisdictions to the opposite effect was viewed as
sufficiently distinguishable that it could not have provided a reasonable
basis for Ross' attorney to raise the objection.145
The effect of Ross is to narrow the gap between the Court's rulings
with respect to retroactivity and procedural defaults. The governing fac-
tors in determining retroactivity are: (1) the purpose to be served by the
new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule by state officials; and
(3) the effect on the administration of justice. 146 Thus, when the new
constitutional rule affects the accuracy of the verdict, could have been
anticipated by the state, and will not disrupt the administration of justice,
it is more likely to be made completely retroactive. Conversely, prophy-
142. See id. at 2911. In such cases the new constitutional rule is generally not made retro-
active because of the reliance of state officials on the former rule and the impact on the admin-
istration of criminal justice. See also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982); Solem v.
Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984). However, when the implicated constitutional right strongly
impacts on the accuracy or reliability of the verdict or the court's power to try the defendant at
all (e.g., double jeopardy claims), the Court may nonetheless apply the particular right retroac-
tively. It might be argued that in the latter situation, law enforcement authorities are penal-
ized for their failure to anticipate the new rule, while the defaults of defense attorneys, under
Reed v. Ross, are excused. This is not inconsistent, however, since the reason the new rule is
made retroactive in the law enforcement context is unrelated to the police reliance factor, but
is instead based on an independent factor relating to the fairness of the verdict.
143. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that the state may require defendant
to bear the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
144. Reed, 104 S. Ct. at 2911.
145. Id. at 2911-12. The dissenters argued that there was no distinction between Reed and
Engle v. Isaac. In Engle, the majority had cited cases in which attorneys had raised a Mulla-
ney-type argument before Winship was decided. Id. at 2915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
dissent viewed the majority's reasoning as "bizarre," since Winship reaffirmed the longstanding
view that the reasonable doubt rule was constitutionally required, and Mullaney was an a
fortiori extension of Winship. But see supra notes 92-99 & 106-107 and accompanying text.
146. Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1341 (1984). With respect to non-Fourth Amend-
ment cases arising on collateral review, the Solem Court reaffirmed the applicability of the
three criteria stated in the text and in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Court uses a
somewhat different analysis with respect to Fourth Amendment issues arising on direct appeal,
see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), as well as Fifth Amendment questions on
direct review, see Shea v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 1065 (1985).
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lactic rules that are a "clear break" with precedent and that have an
adverse impact on the criminal justice process are more likely to be made
only prospective. For example, in Solem v. Stumes, 47 the Court consid-
ered whether Edwards v. Arizona'48 should -be given retroactive applica-
tion on habeas. Edwards held that once a suspect in custody has asserted
the right to counsel, the police cannot initiate further communication
with the accused. In finding Edwards nonretroactive, the majority ana-
lyzed the reliance factor in a manner at odds with the reasoning in Engle.
The Court acknowledged that Edwards was not a "clear break" case, 4 9
but insisted that it nonetheless articulated a new rule since it was not "a
necessary consequence of Miranda," and that the police could not be
blamed for failing to anticipate its per se approach."5 ° The majority
noted that before the Edwards decision, the issue whether the police
could resume questioning after a defendant had asked for an attorney
was "unsettled." '151 The opinion stressed that the disagreement in the
lower courts on this issue precluded a finding that "Edwards had been
'clearly' or 'distinctly' foreshadowed."' 52 The Court considered the reli-
ance interest compelling "even though Edwards did not overrule a spe-
cific decision."' 53 Thus, under Solem, state officials are not required to
anticipate "new" legal principles, and the existence of conflicting lower
court case law in effect insulates law enforcement officials from retroac-
tivity rulings because the Supreme Court's ultimate determination of the
issue cannot be "clearly" anticipated.
On the other hand, in Engle the majority's standard for meeting the
cause requirement for excusing procedural defaults is whether astute at-
147. 104 S. Ct. 1338 (1984).
148. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
149. As the Solem Court noted, "[u]njustified 'reliance' is no bar to retroactivity. This
inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the new decision was foreshadowed by earlier
cases or was a 'clear break with the past.'" 104 S. Ct. at 1343 (footnote omitted). In Shea v.
Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 1065 (1985), Edwards v. Arizona was made retroactive to cases pending
on direct appeal at the time Edwards was decided.
150. 104 S. Ct. at 1344. Justice Stevens argued that the case did not present any real
retroactivity question, since it was well settled before Edwards that the police could not inter-
rogate in these circumstances. Id. at 1348, 1354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Justice Stevens, in dissent, asserted that the majority's analysis was unprecedented,
and that the effect of the majority's reasoning was to eliminate the incentive for authorities to
comply with the plain meaning of the Court's decisions. Id. at 1354 & n. 11.
152. Id. at 1345.
153. Id. Cf Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), in which the Court reiter-
ated that when the major purpose of a new constitutional rule is to prevent substantial impair-
ment of the fact-finding function, thus raising serious questions about the accuracy of guilty
verdicts, the new rule will be given retroactive effect notwithstanding reliance of state officials
and the impact on the administration of justice. Id. at 243 (citing Ivan V. v. City of New
York, 407 U.S. 203, 204 (1972) (per curiam)).
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torneys are making such challenges at the time of defendant's trial. That
there may be a split in the lower courts, or indeed that most courts are
rejecting such challenges, is irrelevant in this context. Thus, the police's
lack of foresight in effect creates a basis for denying retroactivity,
whereas a more excusable lack of foresight of criminal defense counsel is
penalized by denial of the availability of federal habeas, even with respect
to a right that the Court has found to be completely retroactive. While
Mullaney is a sophisticated extension of Winship, Edwards is little more
than an explanation of the obvious in Miranda. Thus, Engle and the
Court's retroactivity rulings work at irrational cross purposes.
Ross somewhat diminishes the disparate treatment of mistakes by
police and those of defense counsel. Just as police are not required to be
seers for purposes of retroactivity, defense counsel's failure to object
based on a completely novel theory of law will not preclude the availabil-
ity of a federal habeas forum to assert a right that has been made com-
pletely retroactive by the Court. This congruity, however, is far from
perfect. Whereas unsettled case law militates in favor of nonretroactiv-
ity, which is a way of excusing state errors, under Engle the same unset-
tled state of the law mandates a finding that counsel could have
anticipated the new rule and that the prisoner will be foreclosed from
federal habeas relief.
154
The Ross decision also somewhat reduced the tension between the
standards for forfeiture rulings with respect to procedural defaults and
those with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court, by re-
fusing to require prescience on the part of defense counsel in anticipating
legal developments, put the criterion for excusing procedural defaults
more in line with the test for determining what constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, although the Engle-Strickland whipsaw still re-
mains basically intact.
1 55
While Ross was clearly a victory for proponents of broader availabil-
ity of federal habeas, it is of limited value. The cause requirement was
found to have been met, but in an extremely circumscribed context. Ross
only excuses defaults based on failure to anticipate a new rule of constitu-
tional law (e.g., Winship) that is once removed from the new rule that is
really applicable (e.g., Mullaney). Under Engle, any case that reasonably
could be analyzed as creating a foundation for extrapolating new legal
principles becomes a two-edged sword. It can be used both to expand
legal frontiers (e.g., Winship as the forerunner of Mullaney) and to trap
154. Under Engle it is unnecessary that the law be unsettled: all that appears to be re-
quired is that some lawyers have made such challenges. See 456 U.S. at 134.
155. See supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
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unwary defense counsel and their clients. Moreover, the Ross majority
was a fragile one. Although Justice Powell joined the majority opinion,
his concurrence made it clear that had the state argued that Mullaney
should not be retroactive on collateral review, he probably would have
reached the opposite result in the case.' 56 Thus, but for the state's de-
fault, the Ross decision might well have gone the other way. This
message surely will not be lost on prosecutors.
Based on the few Supreme Court decisions interpreting the cause
and prejudice requirements, it seems clear that the majority's tests for
these standards are so stringent that the writ is of limited value to prison-
ers whose attorneys have committed even inadvertent procedural de-
faults. For these prisoners, the requirements of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice in the prejudice context and virtually omniscient
counsel in the cause sphere reduce habeas to a remedy available only in
rare circumstances. As a result, the merits of many constitutional claims
of defaulting petitioners will never be reached, thus permitting prisoners
to be incarcerated even though their convictions may be based on uncon-
stitutional practices. These cause and prejudice criteria, working in tan-
dem with the Court's requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, put
habeas virtually out of the reach of state prisoners.
III. Exhaustion of State Remedies-An Emerging
Preclusionary Technique
Enacted in 1948 as a codification of prior case law,'5 7 28 U.S.C.
section 2254(b) precludes availability of federal habeas "unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State."'' 18 Designed to assure that state courts have the first opportu-
nity to evaluate federal constitutional claims, the exhaustion requirement
purportedly furthers the concepts of comity and federalism while reduc-
ing the federal court workload. 59 Supreme Court rulings have indicated
that the exhaustion requirement would be given a common-sense, prag-
156. 104 S. Ct. at 2912-13 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell only concurred in the
judgment in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), because the case was on direct
review.
157. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). For a
discussion of the legislative history of section 2254(b), see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-
50 (1950). For the history of the exhaustion doctrine, see Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in
Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393,
401-13 (1983).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1977).
159. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982).
The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the
enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial procedings. ...
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matic application: Fay v. Noia 160 held that exhaustion is required only
with respect to currently available state remedies; and Brown v. Allen 161
held that exhaustion is satisfied by appeal to the state's highest court
without the prisoner also seeking state collateral relief.
Rose v. Lundy, 162 the Burger Court's major foray into the exhaus-
tion area, however, effects a significant shift in emphasis. 163 The majority
held that mixed petitions, that is, petitions containing both exhausted
and unexhausted claims, whether unrelated or interrelated,164 are re-
quired to be dismissed by the federal habeas court. The decision gives
petitioners the option either of going back to state court to exhaust the
claims not previously presented to that forum before returning to federal
[F]ederal claims that have been fully exhausted in state courts will more often be
accompanied by a complete factual record to aid the federal courts in their review.
Id.
160. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay v. Noia, the Court also specified that it was not necessary
to petition for certiorari in order to fulfill the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 435-36 (dictum).
Although there is a tendency to compartmentalize concepts and to denominate defaults
separately, the unitary nature and interrelationship of such concepts are demonstrated by
Noia. The state argued that the defendant's failure to appeal his judgment of conviction,
thereby failing to challenge his confession as coerced, was either a violation of the exhaustion
requirement (even though state remedies were no longer available), a waiver of his rights, or an
adequate and independent state ground barring federal review of his claim. Id. at 395-99. See
generally Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 78 (1964) (written by former United States District Judge Abraham Sofaer when he
was a student).
161. 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953).
162. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). For an excellent critique of Rose v. Lundy, see Yackle, supra
note 157, at 424-45.
163. In earlier exhaustion decisions, the Burger Court had held that prisoners challenging
the length of their confinement due to losses of good conduct time credits could not proceed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has no exhaustion requirement, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982), and must instead proceed under the habeas statute, which requires exhaus-
tion, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). In addition, exhaustion of remedies after trial
is not required if the purpose of the petitioner's claim is to force the state to abide by its speedy
trial obligations, and the petitioner already has litigated that particular issue in the state
courts. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). See also Pickard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (reaffirming that exhaustion is satisfied only where petitioner is
presenting the same claim in federal court that has already been urged in the state forum).
164. Although the Lundy majority found that the petitioner's claims were related and that
the United States district judge had impermissibly considered both the exhausted and the
unexhausted claims, the ruling applies as well to mixed petitions in which the exhausted and
unexhausted claims are independent. As the majority noted, "[r]equiring dismissal of petitions
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims will relieve the district courts of the diffi-
cult if not impossible task of deciding when claims are related, and will reduce the temptation
to consider unexhausted claims." 455 U.S. at 519. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that
the majority had gone even further and had determined that the federal district judge erred not
only in reaching the merits of the exhausted claims, but also in considering the portions of the
trial record in which the unexhausted claims were described to evaluate the exhausted claims.
Id. at 542. See also infra note 176.
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court, or of resubmitting a new petition to the federal court containing
only exhausted claims.16 5 A plurality suggested, however, that if a pris-
oner elects to remain in federal court by amending the petition-thereby
deleting the unexhausted claims-he or she runs the risk that subsequent
federal habeas action based on the omitted claims will constitute an
abuse of the writ.'6 6
The abuse of process issue aside, the Court's ruling on its surface,
appears to establish a reasonably coherent framework for processing
habeas suits. The reality may prove otherwise. The Lundy decision pre-
cludes any exercise of discretion by federal district judges in this context.
Even though consideration of a meritorious exhausted claim may be the
most efficient and just manner in which to proceed, if the petition con-
tains even one unexhausted claim, however marginal, the federal judge
must dismiss the action. Faced with dismissal, pro se federal habeas peti-
tioners may feel obliged to go back to state court in order to present what
may be even trivial claims, rather than proceeding with more substantial
issues in the federal courts. This wastes the petitioner's time and contin-
ues his or her incarceration even though a valid constitutional challenge
may be involved. It also wastes the state courts' time because they may
be required to consider weak claims. In addition, federal courts' time is
wasted because they must assess whether any unexhausted claims are
presented in the petition, and, if so, they may be required to process the
case a second time before reaching the merits.' 67
165. 455 U.S. at 520. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, took issue with the
majority's ruling, noting that, on the one hand, state prisoners often are permitted simply to
strike unexhausted claims from the petition and proceed as if those claims had not been
presented. He asserted that if that was all the majority had been doing, its approach was the
same as that of the majority of the courts of appeal that had dealt with the issue. His concern,
however, was that the opportunity merely to amend and proceed in this manner would depend
on the petitioner's awareness of the availability of this right, and this would in turn depend
upon petitioner either being a sophisticated litigator or appearing before a sympathetic judge.
On the other hand, if the Court's ruling required the petitioner to refile after striking
unexhausted claims, even those who wished to forego exhaustion of state claims and to pro-
ceed with exhausted claims in the federal forum would have to begin again, with attendant
delays in again reaching the top of the federal court's docket. Id. at 529-31. See Slayton v.
Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971) (per curiam) (if prisoner is required to exhaust claims in state court,
federal court should dismiss habeas petition rather than hold it on the docket).
166. See 455 U.S. at 520-21; but see id. at 533-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), arguing that dismissal for abuse of the writ, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule
9(b) (1976), is appropriate only when a prisoner is free to include all claims in his or her first
petition, but knowingly and deliberately does not do so. The abuse-of-process issue had not
been presented, argued, or briefed by the parties. For a discussion of abuse of the writ in death
penalty cases, see Witt v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 1415 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari and application for stay).
167. See 455 U.S. at 523-31 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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While such exhaustion determinations by the federal courts may not
seem difficult, '68 the Court itself has discovered, for example, that state
court consideration of federal claims is not always visible. In Smith v.
Digmon, 69 the district court dismissed a habeas petition for failure to
exhaust one of the claims, stating that it was inconceivable that the state
court would not have mentioned the contention in its opinion denying
relief had the claim been raised there. After the court of appeals denied
leave to appeal, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, finding that the
prisoner's state court brief had in fact set forth the claim in question.
The Court stressed that a state appellate court cannot effectively preclude
exhaustion by ignoring in its opinion a federal claim directly presented to
it by petitioner in his brief, and that a federal district court cannot as-
sume that petitioner failed to exhaust simply because the state court
opinion contains no reference to the claim. 170
On the one hand, the Lundy Court rejected the argument that a
dismissal requirement for mixed petitions would burden the lower federal
courts, which would be required to determine that all claims had been
exhausted before reaching the merits of any claim. ' On the other hand,
in Duckworth v. Serrano'72 the Court refused to create an exception to
the exhaustion requirement for "clear violations," which would have ex-
pedited plainly meritorious petitions, claiming that the determination of
which cases met that criterion would require expenditure of significantly
more time and resources by the federal courts. 173 Thus, it appears that
168. Notwithstanding the ostensible simplicity of exhaustion determinations, the federal
courts often are faced with difficult issues in this context. See, e.g., Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d
594, 597-99 (2d Cir. 1979); Piercy v. Parratt, 579 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1978); Carter v. Estelle,
499 F. Supp. 777, 779-83 (S.D. Tex. 1980), af'd, 677 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1056 (1983).
169. 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (per curiam).
170. The Court found it "inexplicable" that the attorney general's reply to the petition for
certiorari failed to mention that the prisoner had in fact raised his claim in the Alabama
courts. Id. at 333 n.2. Even so, Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurring opinion, in
which the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun joined, expressing doubt that the petitioner had
properly presented the district court's error to the court of appeals. Id. at 334. See also Sum-
ner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) discussed infra at notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
171. 455 U.S. at 520; id. at 526 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). But see supra
note 168.
172. 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
173. Compare Duckworth with Public Utilities Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S.
456 (1943), which excused failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the state commis-
sion's orders were plainly invalid on their face. The policy concerns in this state administrative
law area are not dissimilar from those in the habeas context; they may include federalism,
comity, avoiding disruption of the state proceeding, and judicial economy. See also Roberts v.
LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam) (holding that an intervening change in state law that
occurred after the prisoner's exhaustion of state remedies and that might have changed the
result in the state court, nonetheless did not require petitioner to return to the latter forum).
the Court would rather have a district judge spend considerable time de-
ciding, for example, whether a petitioner's coerced confession claim had
been exhausted, rather than deciding the more pertinent issue whether
the confession was coerced, even when it is quite clear that the confession
was in fact coerced.
In light of the possibility that petitioners who elect to proceed in
federal court after dismissal on exhaustion grounds may be faced with
charges of abuse of the writ, the Court's approach in Lundy, as suggested
by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, may "serve to trap the
unwary pro se prisoner who is not knowledgeable about the intricacies of
the exhaustion doctrine."174 Ironically, Justice O'Connor's pronounce-
ment that prisoners without attorneys would have no difficulty in master-
ing the Court's newly created, but, in her view, "straightforward
exhaustion requirement," 175 came in a case that reversed a federal dis-
trict court and court of appeals, and that spawned five separate opinions
by the Justices.
176
Essentially, the Court has established exhaustion guidelines that re-
quire habeas petitioners, most of whom are pro se, 177 to make sophisti-
cated legal judgments concerning the strength of their claims and to
make difficult strategic choices about the appropriate forum in which to
proceed. For those with meritorious claims, the wrong choice could
174. 455 U.S. at 530.
175. Id. at 520.
176. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion requiring total exhaustion, which in-
cluded within it the plurality opinion regarding abuse of the writ. Justice Blackmun wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which he disagreed with both parts of Justice
O'Connor's opinion. He would have remanded the case, ordering dismissal of respondent's
unexhausted claims and examination of the exhausted claims to determine if they were interre-
lated with the unexhausted grounds, and, if they were not, to determine if they warranted
collateral relief. Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the majority's total exhaustion requirement, but dis-
sented from the plurality position regarding dismissal for abuse of process. Id. at 532-33 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed with most of Justice Brennan's opinion, but, like Justice Blackmun, would not have
required that a mixed petition be totally dismissed. He would have allowed the trial judge to
rule on the exhausted issues unless they were intertwined with unexhausted claims. Id. at 538
(White, J., concurring and dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens, dissenting, described different
levels of constitutional error and concluded that district judges should have the discretion to
determine whether the presence of an unexhausted claim in a habeas petition makes it inappro-
priate to consider the merits of an exhausted claim. Id. at 543-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Allen, Schactman, & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and Its Reform: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 679 n.6, 733-34 (1982), in which a study of approximately
1,900 federal habeas petitions filed in six districts and one court of appeals over a two-year
period revealed that 79% were pro se. Not surprisingly, petitioners represented by counsel
prevailed in whole or in part in 12.6% of their cases, whereas pro se petitioners did so in only
.8% of their cases. Id. at 746.
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mean either unnecessary continued incarceration or possible dismissal
for abuse of the writ.
The prisoner's difficulties are exacerbated by the Court's require-
ment that petitioners must have "fairly presented" the substance of their
federal habeas claims to the state courts. In Anderson v. Harless, 78 the
Court in a summary decision required a prisoner to return to the Michi-
gan courts to exhaust his claim that the trial court's instruction on malice
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. Petitioner had in fact made
such a contention on direct appeal, claiming that the malice instruction
was "reversible error" and quoting from a Michigan case holding that
under state law malice could not be inferred from the use of a weapon.
Although the court in the cited case had decided that the challenged
instruction violated state law, it had also considered broader attacks on
the instruction based on the due process right to a fair trial.179 Indeed,
the lower federal courts in Harless had concluded that the state courts
had had a fair opportunity to consider the federal claim. 80 Nonetheless,
the Court found petitioner's brief insufficient to apprise the state court of
the basis of his federal claim.1
8 1
The contrast between the solicitude shown for state court judges in
Harless and the legal acumen required of habeas petitioners or their at-
torneys in Lundy is striking. Similarly, in Engle v. Isaac 182 defense attor-
neys were expected to anticipate the Supreme Court decision in Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 18 3 based on the ruling five years earlier in In re Winship, 84
and failure to do so resulted in forfeiture of their clients' rights to federal
habeas corpus. In Harless, however, petitioner was deemed not to have
exhausted state remedies on the theory that the state courts could not be
178. 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam).
179. See id. at 10-11 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 11 n.4.
181. The decision in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971), requiring that defendant fairly
present the "substance" of his federal claim, is not dispositive of the Harless issue. As Justice
Stevens noted in his Harless dissent, in Picard the petitioner had made a due process argument
in the state courts and an equal protection argument in the federal courts, although both were
based on the same facts. In Harless, however, the substance of the petitioner's challenge was
the same in both forums, since his claim was that the instructions created a mandatory pre-
sumption of malice and thereby deprived him of a fair jury trial. 459 U.S. at 11-12 n.5.
The requirement that the prisoner's claim be fairly presented to the state court is strin-
gently interpreted. See, e.g., Moore v. Duckworth, 581 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1978), affd, 443
U.S. 713 (1979) (per curiam); Paullet v. Howard, 634 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1175 (1983); Klein v.
Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981); but cf McShall v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp. 158, 160 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (brief not required to contain "talismanic" words).
182. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). See supra notes 92-123 and accompanying text.
183. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
184. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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expected to divine from his appeal, which challenged the jury instruc-
tions as reversible error, that defendant was making a federal due process
constitutional claim, even though petitioner's appeal was taken two years
after the Mullaney decision.'
Inasmuch as the Court's tougher exhaustion requirements delay
rather than preclude habeas review, they are not as draconian in their
effect as Stone v. Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes. However, the Lundy
plurality's strictures concerning abuse of the writ go beyond deferral of
relief. Even aside from the possibility of dismissal on that basis, "mere"
delay may effectively preclude vindication of constitutional rights. Apro
se prisoner who is shuttled from federal to state court and back again
may be released in the interim and decide to drop the petition, or may
watch the evidentiary basis of a bona fide claim dissipate."8 6 Thus, the
distinction between deferral and denial may be more theoretical than
actual.
Taken together, these three lines of cases have a synergistic effect in
constricting the availability of federal habeas corpus. Moreover, the re-
maining federal avenues still left open are being closed by the Court's use
of one set of standards to govern the defaults or errors of state officials
and another with respect to defendants and their attorneys.
IV. Stacking the Deck To Favor the State
One of the primary aims of the Burger Court has been to reinvigo-
rate federalism." 7 To this end, the Court has repeatedly deferred to the
state courts,18 8 sometimes appearing to give the states not only deference
185. Defendant's appeal in state court was taken in 1977. Although the district court in
Harless had relied primarily on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which invalidated
a particular jury instruction shifting the burden of proof concerning malice, that decision,
although also implicating another line of cases dealing with presumptions, was an obvious
spin-off from Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See 442 U.S. at 520-27.
186. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 528 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
In addition, assuming that the prisoner does make it back to federal court, the promise of
an independent review of his or her federal constitutional claim may be only technically ful-
filled by virtue of the Court's increasingly stringent interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),
which presumes that the state court's findings of fact are correct. The effect may be no more
than superficial federal review. See infra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
187. Although the zenith of the Court's federalism drive, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), has been overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), its spirit can be seen in other decisions of the Court. See infra
note 188. Moreover, Garcia was a 5-4 decision, and, at least according to dissenting Justice
Rehnquist, Usery, which he authored, will rise again. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1033.
188. See, eg., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)
(prohibiting the federal courts from enforcing a pendent state law claim against state officials);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (prohibiting federal court injunctive relief against
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but preference.18 9 This policy has been most explicit in the habeas
corpus area because of the inherent federal-state tensions built into the
federal habeas review process.1 90 In fact, however, the Court's respect
for state tribunals and state legal officials is, in many instances, outcome-
oriented.
As already indicated, the Court, in its preclusionary, procedural de-
fault and exhaustion decisions, has erected stringent, hypertechnical har-
riers for habeas petitioners to overcome, with severe sanctions for failure
to do so. At the same time, in cases such as Harless, 191 it has cosseted
the state court systems.' 92 A reading of other decisions by the Court,
both within and outside the habeas area, indicates that this dichotomy is
not aberrant. For example, the most egregious violations of due process
by state court judges may be immune from suit for money damages
under the federal civil rights laws, even where there is no possibility of
correctability on appeal.193
The Court's willingness to defer to state tribunals is also illustrated
by its decision in Marshall v. Lonberger, 194 in which the state trial court
had neglected to make findings on the habeas petitioner's credibility.
state attachment law where state officials had sued plaintiffs in state court to recover allegedly
fraudulently obtained welfare payments and had begun attachment proceedings); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that severe corporal punishment of public school stu-
dents invades a liberty interest, but that procedural due process does not require a pre-discipli-
nary hearing because of the availability of state court tort and criminal remedies).
189. See Rosenberg, The Horowitz Affair, 58 B.U.L. REv. 733, 763-64 (1978):
[T]he Court all too often appears to be selecting for review cases involving gross
constitutional violations . . . . In adjudicating these more rudimentary claims, the
Court has adopted two related approaches. When it upholds government power,
• . . the Court tends to do so on broad grounds. Yet, when it sustains the individ-
ual's claim, it often does so on considerably narrower grounds. The effect is to send
out signals to government officials either that almost anything goes in the particular
area in which their power has been upheld or, where their authority has been denied,
that a slightly less obvious intrusion on individual rights may well withstand consti-
tutional challenge.
190. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Even in capital cases, the Court has voiced concern that
habeas not be used to thwart the state's legitimate interests. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 882 (1983), the majority stressed that "[flederal courts are not forums in which to reliti-
gate state trials." The Court held that although the courts of appeal must decide the merits of
a nonfrivolous appeal before denying a stay, they may invoke summary procedures to do so.
Id. at 889.
191. 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam).
192. See supra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
193. E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding that any judicial act within
the state court's subject matter jurisdiction confers absolute immunity in suits for money dam-
ages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the defendant judge had issued an exparte order for sterilization
of a 15-year-old girl). Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (holding that the judicial immunity
doctrine does not bar prospective relief or the award of attorneys' fees).
194. 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
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Under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d), state court factual determinations are
presumed correct, whereas questions of law and mixed questions of fact
and law are not entitled to similar deference.19 In Lonberger, the Court
in effect supplied the missing finding of fact by assuming that the state
tribunal had applied the correct standard of federal law,19 6 and thus
would have granted the prisoner relief had it believed him. It conse-
quently determined that the state court's ruling against him was "tanta-
mount to a refusal to believe the testimony of respondent.
'197
Yet the Court is not uniformly solicitous of state court abilities to
understand legal issues. In Michigan v. Long, 198 the Court, reversing
longstanding practice,199 held that if an ambiguous state court opinion
did not contain a plain statement that the case was decided on "adequate
and independent" state law grounds, the Court would presume it was
decided on federal grounds."z° Absent such a plain statement in other-
195. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
309 & n.6 (1963). The Court has become more likely to find particular issues factual rather
than mixed questions, and to deny relief both on that basis and on the basis that the state
court's findings were "fairly supported by the record" within the meaning of section 2254(d).
See, eg., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (per
curiam); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539
(1981), 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (per curiam).
On the other hand, the Court has interpreted the custody requirement of section 2254(a)
more generously for petitioners. See, eg., Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294,
300 (1984); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
196. As the Court in Lonberger noted, this assumption stems from Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. at 314-15, in which the Court indicated that "in the ordinary case" in which the state
court has not articulated the standard of federal law, it may be assumed that the trier of fact
applied the correct standard. 459 U.S. at 433. As an example of the "ordinary case," the
Townsend Court stated that if a petitioner alleged that his confession was obtained by "third-
degree methods," the federal court could assume that if the state trier ruled against petitioner,
it did so on the facts because the law was so clear in this regard. 372 U.S. at 315. The compli-
cated fact pattern and interrelated legal issues in Lonberger make that case far removed from
the Townsend example.
197. 459 U.S. at 434 (footnote omitted).
198. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
199. See id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1041-44 n.7 & 8. The ambiguity could result from primary reliance on federal
law, from an interweaving of federal and state law, or from uncertainty on the face of the
opinion as to the adequacy and independence of the state law ground. See id. at 1040-41; see
also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
The adequate and independent state ground rule is a jurisdictional barrier designed to
prevent the Court from rendering advisory opinions. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-
26 (1945). State courts are of course free to give greater protection pursuant to their own
constitutions or statutes, but may not do so as a matter of federal law. Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). Rulings based on state law may not be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Starting in the
1930's and 1940's, ambiguous state court decisions were either dismissed or remanded for
clarification. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1066-67. In the early 1980's, however, the Court began to
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wise ambiguous cases, the Court has created a presumption that cases are
being decided on federal law grounds, whereas in Harless, the presump-
tion is that the case was decided exclusively on the basis of state law.201
The result of the rule announced in Long is to permit the Supreme Court
to review state court decisions in favor of the accused, which, in the Bur-
ger Court era, inevitably means reversal and a decision against the indi-
vidual rights of citizens.2 °2
Nonetheless, when a state court opinion is unambiguous and clearly
rests on adequate and independent state grounds, thus precluding
Supreme Court review,2 °3 the Chief Justice has expressed exasperation
with expansive interpretations of state constitutional provisions by his
colleagues in the state judicial systems. In Florida v. Casal,2 1 for exam-
ple, the Chief Justice, concurring in dismissal of a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, expressed doubt that the Florida counterpart of
the Fourth Amendment actually required suppression of the evidence
and applauded the citizens of Florida for amending their state constitu-
tion to prevent such results in the future. He concluded that "[w]hen
state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitu-
tion requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the
power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement."20 5 Thus,
although the adequate and independent state ground rule has furthered
federalism and facilitated diversity by permitting federal constitutional
limitations to act as a floor rather than a ceiling,20 6 the Chief Justice
undertake examinations of state laws to determine if decisions were based on adequate and
independent state grounds. See id. In Long, the Court discarded the foregoing methods of
dealing with ambiguous state court decisions and concluded that the best approach was to
assume jurisdiction absent a plain statement of a state law basis. The Long approach, accord-
ing to the majority, furthers uniformity of federal law, avoids advisory opinions, and enhances
state court independence. But see id. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am thoroughly baf-
fled by the Court's suggestion that it must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of
the Michigan Supreme Court in order to show '[r]espect for the independence of state
courts.' ").
201. 459 U.S. at 7.
202. 463 U.S. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting), referring to a Supreme Court "docket swol-
len with requests by states to reverse judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of
their citizens."
203. See supra note 200.
204. 462 U.S. 637 (1983) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 639. The Chief Justice also has expressed vigorous opposition to broad availa-
bility of federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (statement
concerning denial of certiorari) (the Chief Justice urged summary dismissal of belated habeas
petitions when the state can show that lapse of time has made reprosecution impossible, unless
petitioner can establish a "significant miscarriage of justice"). Id. at 1097-98.
206. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
would turn the doctrine on its head, converting the Constitution into a
ceiling-and a very low ceiling at that.
20 7
In some circumstances-when convenient-the Justices appear will-
ing to view their state counterparts as quite competent. In Stone v. Pow-
ell,208 for example, the majority explicitly rejected the argument that
state court judges were either unwilling or unable to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, it deplored the lack of trust that such an argu-
ment implied and favorably compared state court judges' abilities to in-
terpret the Fourth Amendment with those of federal judges.
20 9
Similarly, in Ross v. Moffitt 2 1o the Court ruled that neither due process
nor equal protection required the state to assign counsel for discretionary
appeals to its highest court.2" Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion pre-
sumed that by using the record below, supplemented by any materials
that thepro se defendant supplied, the state tribunals would have an ade-
quate basis to determine whether to review the case.212 In Harless,21 3 on
the other hand, the state appellate courts had to be told with considera-
ble specificity that the claim raised by the habeas petitioner was based on
federal as well as state law.
State judges are not the only state officials given preferred treatment
by the Court. Although the Court punishes petitioners who inadver-
tently mix exhausted and unexhausted claims or who commit inadvertent
procedural defaults, it is considerably more solicitous of defaults by state
attorneys general, even when they are deliberate.2 4 For example, in
Sumner v. Mata,215 the Court applied to state appellate court findings the
requirement of section 2254(d) that state court findings of fact be pre-
sumed correct. It reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had affirmed the
grant of a writ, even though the state had abandoned on appeal any claim
207. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
208. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
209. Id. at 493 n.35. But see Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105
(1977); Peller, supra note 3, at 663-69.
210. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
211. Id. at 610, 618-19. The Court also held that the Constitution does not require the
state to provide counsel for defendants seeking review of their convictions in the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 616-18.
212. Id. at 615.
213. See supra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
214. But cf, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) and Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Per. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (proof of deliberate intent to discrimi-
nate establishes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
215. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
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based on section 2254(d).
216
Similarly, in the October 1983 Term, the Court granted certiorari in
New Jersey v. T.L.O.217 to answer the question whether the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule was applicable to searches of students by
public school officials. The state of New Jersey had argued in state court
not only that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to delinquency pro-
ceedings, but also that the search was constitutional.218 Thus, the state
had abandoned the latter claim before the Supreme Court. Nonetheless,
at the end of the Term, five Justices agreed to set the case for reargument
and directed the parties to brief the issue whether the search by school
officials violated the Fourth Amendment.2" 9 In his opinion dissenting
from the reargument order, Justice Stevens admonished the majority for
its action, stating: "[O]f late, the Court has acquired a voracious appetite
for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least
when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen.
220
Not surprisingly, the Court ultimately decided that although the Fourth
Amendment applied to searches of public school students, the appropri-
ate standard was a low level "reasonableness under all the circum-
stances" test that had not been violated in the instant case.221
In practical terms, the majority in TL.O. came to the aid of the
highest legal official of the state, who obviously had made a strategic
decision not to raise a particular issue.222 In habeas terms, the Attorney
General had committed a deliberate bypass, and, even under Fay v.
Noia,223 such action by a petitioner would be punished by dismissal.
Moreover, in the procedural default context, if the state contests the
merits of petitioner's constitutional claim notwithstanding the default,
the federal courts will reach the merits.224 Similarly, if a prisoner
216. Id. at 547 n.2; id. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority asserted that it was
determining the issue in order to assure that the lower court had not exceeded its jurisdiction.
217. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
218. In re T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
219. 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984).
220. Id.
221. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). The Court's ruling upheld a school
official's search of a student's purse for evidence that would impeach her claim that she had
not violated a school rule prohibiting smoking in the bathrooms. Id. at 745-47.
222. The state claimed that it had not earlier raised the Fourth Amendment contention
before the Court because such a determination was basically factual and because a decision
relying on the exclusionary rule would make it unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of
the constitutionality of the search. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner on Reargument, at 6-
7, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
223. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
224. See Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493, 496 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
431 U.S. 145 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 n.* (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
presents a petition with exhausted and unexhausted claims, the federal
court must dismiss unless the state agrees to reach the merits of the
225unexhausted issues.
Thus, prisoners whose attorneys default are denied federal court re-
view, and those who even inadvertently mix exhausted and unexhausted
claims are sent back to state court only to return again to federal court
before relief may be available; the result may be increased periods of in-
carcertion and ultimately dismissal of their petitions. By comparison
state officials can in effect require consideration of unexhausted and de-
faulted claims by the federal habeas courts, and their strategic decisions
to withhold constitutional claims, if found to be ill-advised, may be over-
looked by the nation's highest tribunal.
While the state's legal officers are thus apparently given every bene-
fit of the doubt, the habeas petitioner fares less well. There is no right to
counsel either in federal habeas actions226 or in discretionary appeals.
227
Although entitled to reasonably competent counsel at trial228 and on first
appeal,229 the accused has no right to an attorney sufficiently astute to
foresee subsequent Supreme Court rulings and thereby avoid the catas-
trophe of a procedural default barring federal habeas.230
Under Sykes, a trial default committed solely by counsel without
prior consultation with the client is nonetheless binding.231 Notwith-
standing counsel's broad power to preclude vindication of federal consti-
ring); cf Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 292 n.9 (1975) and Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967) (when state courts decided each petitioner's constitutional claim on
the merits despite procedural default, federal habeas courts will not impose forfeiture). On the
other hand, where the state has not argued in the lower courts that habeas is barred because of
a procedural default, the Supreme Court will refuse to entertain such an argument. See Jen-
kins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.1 (1980).
225. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2060, 2063 (1984).
226. Ardister v. Hopper, 500 F.2d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 1974); Plaskett v. Page, 439 F.2d 770,
771 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404, 406
(2d Cir. 1964). But cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (requiring states to assure access
to courts by providing adequate law libraries or alternative methods of assisting prisoners in
the presentation of claims).
227. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
228. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984) (requiring reasonably compe-
tent counsel at trials and at capital sentencing proceedings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (right to counsel in misdemeanors that result in jail time); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony cases).
229. Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (requiring effective assistance of counsel on first
appeal as of right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Because there is no right to
counsel in discretionary state appeals, counsel's failure to file a timely writ in state supreme
court does not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S.
586 (1982) (per curiam).
230. See supra notes 106-123 and accompanying text.
231. 433 U.S. at 72, 91 n.14 (1977); id. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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tutional claims, the Sixth Amendment gives the accused no right to a
meaningful attorney-client relationship that will assure an indigent de-
fendant continued representation by the same attorney.23 2 Although an
accused has the right to pro se representation,23 3 if he or she accepts
counsel, there is no constitutional right to compel the attorney to assert
nonfrivolous issues that the client wishes to have presented if the attor-
ney decides as a matter of professional judgment not to do SO.2 34 This
ruling raises the obvious question of the effect on the availability of fed-
eral habeas of a refusal by counsel to argue an issue urged by the client.
The Court's only response was a footnote statement that "we have no
occasion to decide whether counsel's refusal to raise requested claims
would constitute 'cause for a petitioner's default.' "235
It thus appears that the Court is establishing one set of ground rules
for habeas petitioners and their attorneys and another for the state and
its legal representatives. While it may be that "the Great Writ imposes
special costs on our federal system, '236 the proper way to manage those
costs cannot lie in stacking the deck against the Bill of Rights and the
remedies for its vindication.
Conclusion
While the Court, in its decisions since Stone v. Powell and Wain-
wright v. Sykes, has not completely eliminated federal habeas corpus as a
viable remedy for unconstitutional detention by state authorities, it has
circumscribed its availability, almost rendering it an extraordinary rem-
edy confined to prevention of miscarriages of justice. Although the Stone
v. Powell preclusionary doctrine has not been extended beyond its Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule origins, the potential for expansion still
exists. At the same time, the procedural default rules have been refined
and tightened, and the interpretation of the requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies has created a maze that many habeas petitioners may be
unable to master.
Moreover, the Court has applied forfeiture rules in an uneven fash-
ion. While pro se defendants are subjected to harsh penalties, state judi-
cial and legal officials are indulged with almost every benefit of the
232. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
233. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); but see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984) (stand-by counsel's participation in trial of pro se defendant held not to violate Faretta).
234. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
235. Id. at 754 n.7.
236. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
doubt-unless to do so would provide an escape hatch for the accused in
a criminal case.
The Court's forfeiture cases also rest uncomfortably alongside its
retroactivity and ineffective assistance rulings. New decisions may not be
applied retroactively if there was unsettled lower court case law because
police should not be required to predict how the Supreme Court will
ultimately rule on an issue. Defense counsel's failure to anticipate
Supreme Court rulings will not constitute cause to excuse a default, how-
ever, even where the decisions are far less foreseeable. As long as some
attorneys somewhere have made such objections, the habeas remedy may
be effectively foreclosed. Yet counsel's failure generally will not be suffi-
cient to amount to ineffective assistance. Heads the state wins, tails the
state wins.
This ongoing evisceration of the habeas remedy roughly tracks the
Court's constriction of substantive constitutional rights. While the Court
is unwilling, for the most part, to overrule major Warren Court decisions
governing the procedural guarantees given the accused in criminal pro-
ceedings, it has chipped away at them repeatedly, in some instances leav-
ing only shards of the original rulings.237 Habeas is in an even greater
state of decline. Thus, to conform with the Burger Court's constricted
visions of federalism and finality, both the Bill of Rights and the Great
Writ are being scaled down. Such procedural and substantive diminu-
tion of protection indicates that, at least in this context, the Court views
personal liberty as expendable.
237. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), whose holdings remain only in skeletal form. Among the primary decisions scaling
down Mapp are United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 464 U.S. 810
(1984); and U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Their counterparts with respect to Mi-
randa include Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984). For a discussion of the cutbacks by the Burger Court of the constitutional protections
afforded the criminal defendant by the Warren Court, see Goldberg, Stanley Mosk: A Federal-
istfor the 1980's, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. LAW Q. 395, 399-401, 413-418 (1985).
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